

出國報告（出國類別：國際會議）

第三十九屆維根斯坦國際會議—現今的美學 (39<sup>th</sup> International Wittgenstein Symposium—Aesthetics Today)

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## 摘要

維根斯坦(1889-1951)為當代最重要的哲學家之一，其哲學理論極具創見以及深刻的意涵，目前仍是哲學研究重要而且熱門的一個課題。為了紀念以及探討維根斯坦的哲學，維根斯坦國際會議(International Wittgenstein Symposium)自 1976 年起迄今已經舉辦了 39 屆，是相當具有傳統並受哲學界重視的大型學術會議之一。本次會議時間為 2016 年 8 月 7 日至 8 月 13 日，主題為「現今的美學」(Aesthetics Today)，而筆者的研究與之相關，是以撰寫“Identity of Art Objects—A Mereological Analysis”一文發表。該文討論藝術作品的部分與整體之間的邏輯關係，並嘗試發掘相關的基本原則。筆者的演講排在 8 月 8 日下午，聽眾不少，並且多所互動，使筆者獲益良多。筆者並在會議期間積極參與聽講，吸取新知，得到許多啟迪。

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## 目的

維根斯坦國際會議(International Wittgenstein Symposium)自 1976 年起迄今已經舉辦了 39 屆，是相當具有傳統並受哲學界重視的大型學術會議之一。本次會議時間為 2016 年 8 月 7 日至 8 月 13 日，主題為「現今的美學」(Aesthetics Today)，而筆者的研究與之相關，是以撰寫“Identity of Art Objects—A Mereological Analysis”一文發表。筆者與會的主要目的當然是希望藉此與國際哲學研究者分享筆者的研究成果，並希望能得到從不同的觀點出發的批評與回饋，以期能夠更進一步修正、補充或發展筆者的研究所得，使之更加完備與深化。而另一個重要的目的則是希望藉由聆聽其他哲學研究者的演講，了解學界新的發展趨勢以及新的研究課題，以便從中吸取養分，從而得到研究上的觸發。

## 過程

2016 年度第 39 屆維根斯坦國際會議會期為 8 月 7 日至 8 月 13 日，而會議舉行的地點依舊為 Kirchberg am Wechsel，這是距離奧地利首府維也納約一小時車程的一個小鎮。由於維根斯坦曾在鄰近的一所小學任教，為了紀念這一位天才哲學家，自 1976 年起在 Kirchberg am Wechsel 舉行國際學術會議，今年已經是第 39 屆。該會議除了討論維根斯坦的哲學理論之外，每年並設定主題，廣邀各國哲學研究者參與，而經由長期的耕耘，參與者的質與量都大幅成長，已成為哲學界每年例行的重要研討會之一。本次會議設定的主題為「現今的美學」(Aesthetics Today)，而因為美學是筆者的研究興趣之一，且筆者目前所從事的研究也可在此議題上有所發揮，因此特別撰寫論文投稿，並在 4 月底通過審查，得以前往發表該文。

因為希望有前置的準備以及調適的時間，再加上航班安排上的考量，筆者於 8 月 3 日搭乘華航班機前往維也納，於 8 月 4 日抵達。筆者的演講時間排在 8 月 8 日下午 3 時 15 分至 3 時 55 分，發表的論文題目為“Identity of Art Objects—A Mereological Analysis” (論文請見附錄)。這篇論文的主旨在於討論藝術作品的部分與整體之間的邏輯關係，並嘗試發掘相關的基本原則。更具體地說，文中探討一件藝術作品的部分的改變(change of parts)如何影響該作品的同一性(identity)，並分別探討具體的藝術作品及抽象的藝術作品此兩大類，提出一些相關的邏輯法則以及一些概念上的重新定義，例如，有別於一些傳統的哲學主張把抽象的藝術作品視為「類型」(type)，筆者將之視為由「類型所形成的類」(a class of types)，而此重新定義有助於說明藝術作品的變動。

筆者演講時在場的聽眾不少，且提出幾個相當有趣的問題，有助筆者在更大的美學研究的脈絡下審視自己文章的意義及可能發展的方向。以下是筆者根據現場的回饋，重新整理出來的一些問題與省思。

(1) 何謂關於藝術作品的部分整體關係的邏輯分析？有些聽眾所期待的是經驗事實的梳理及分析，例如針對一些確實存在的藝術作品，討論其內容與結構，然而這是個例的研究，其成果的應用有很大的局限。筆者所要討論的是適用於藝術作品的通則，而表達這些通則所牽涉到的主要述詞為「部分」，例如「若所有 A 的部分都是 B 的部分，則 A 為 B 的一個部分」這樣的通則。這類型的邏輯研究所從事的是對詞語意義的分析，雖然對詞語意義的理解有賴於經驗事實的觀察

與認知，但一旦掌握其意義之後，所析取出來的原則不僅適用於幫助吾人理解詞語意義的具體例子，而會是有廣泛應用的通則。

(2) 通則在應用時，常有賴經驗事實的考查來決定一些詞語的解釋或其具體的對應。基本上，通則的表達是型式的，也就是並不會指定其中詞語的解釋或者是對應，因為解釋或者對應必須透過經驗事實的考查來決定。例如一件抽象的藝術作品是「類型所形成的類」，但哪些「類型」(types)在此「類」(class)中，則可能要由經驗事實的考查來決定。比方說，要知道哪些文字所形成的「樣式」(pattern)(這是屬於「類型」)可視為同一首詩(也就是一首詩是由哪些文字樣式所形成的「類」)，就要透過文學的、歷史的等等面向的經驗事實的考查來決定。聽眾或許會誤解筆者的主張，以為這些邏輯通則已決定了個別的藝術品的同一性，但實際上這是個開放的問題。基本上，筆者的理論並不預設藝術品的同一性問題有絕對的答案，而該問題的解答或許是「約定的」(conventional)，亦即是由相關的社群的歷史活動來決定答案，也因此有變動的可能。

(3) 筆者提出一些概念上的重新定義，例如對抽象藝術作品的定義，而此舉的動機是要消弭傳統哲學理論中的一些困難，例如抽象的作品如何可能有變動等的問題(抽象事物-例如數學物件-的存在是沒有始終的，也不可能有所變動)。就「常識性的想法」(commonsensical thinking)來說，有不少抽象的藝術作品，例如詩詞、音樂等，確實會有變動，例如一首音樂改動了幾個音符之後還是被視為同一件作品。而筆者認為一套哲學理論應設法與常識性的想法相容，也因此觸發了前述有別於傳統的定義。筆者在此確實採取了某種哲學立場，可能有些哲學研究者會不贊同，這可能也是有些聽眾難以理解筆者的理論的原因。他們的困擾在於如何以常識性的想法來說明藝術作品的同一性這個形上學的問題，但實際上，筆者並非以援引常識性的想法作為理論成立的理由，而是提出一套邏輯的重構來「容攝」(accommodate)常識性的想法。

除了發表論文之外，筆者也聽了不少場的演講。從演講的內容及論述方式來看，講者應該是來自不同的學術背景，例如文學、歷史、社會學等，而縱使是哲學背景也可能是較注重歐陸的傳統。由於專長的不同，有些細節並不是筆者所能掌握的，但整體的進路或研究方法則相當值得借鏡。例如重視歷史的研究，像是從藝術史來看藝術品同一性的問題(這也是筆者的聽眾所提出的見解之一)；或是重視文化的研究，例如將維根斯坦視為文化批評者；或是重視社群活動的研究，例如藝術相關社群的活動，像是創作或是批評的考查；或是著重於個別的人物、

作品或經驗的研究，這種見似局限的作法，經由深入的發掘，有可能得到普遍的真理。

總之，本次與會者的多樣性對筆者是很好的經驗，因為各種不同的想法交會激盪有助於認清或修正自己的定位，以及改革或創新理論。會議於 8 月 13 日結束。筆者於 8 月 14 日搭機返國，於 8 月 15 日抵達台北。

## 心得及建議

筆者本次與會最深刻的體會就是：一些基本的哲學議題其實是諸多人文學科的研究交集，而各個學科從不同的觀點、進路，採取不同的研究方法，並且基於不同的基本立場或信念，甚或是基於不同的、複雜的「世界觀」，來探討並提出各自的見解，而哲學研究者不能因為持有「這是哲學議題」這種態度而忽視來自其他研究傳統的理論。與不同領域的研究者在交集的議題上進行交流對自己的「定位」極有幫助，亦即透過看到其他研究者的立場，來知道自己的論述是否應「修正」方向。人文學科交集的一些議題，如藝術等，可說是人類最重要的共同關懷。哲學研究者若局限於學門的研究傳統，走向就可能過偏，以至於其他領域的研究者難以理解甚或懷疑其重要性。哲學的發展越來越分化及專精，太多的研究者專注於分化出的細部問題，設限於小規模的研究族群，對他們來說一個問題的解決就是該族群在該問題已取得共識，但在這種發展趨勢下，研究的視野(vision)會趨於狹隘，也會忘了什麼是基本的關懷。

根據以上所說的，筆者當然會建議國內人文學界能有更多跨領域的對話平台，或者更進一步的作法是要從教育上進行改革，讓各學門的學生都能培養出對其他領域的興趣與尊重。

## 附錄

### Identity of Art Objects—A Mereological Analysis

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**Abstract.** This short essay will look into how changes of parts of a piece of art affect its identity. It will argue that if a piece of art is physical, its identity may not be solely determined by its proper parts, but at the same time there could be some of its proper parts which are essential to its identity. The same remarks will also hold for an art object which contains no physical parts. It will also propose that in order to account for changes of its parts, an art object which contains no physical parts should be viewed as a class of types instead of a type. Some further issues will also be suggested at the end of the essay.

#### 1. Physical Art Objects

Consider a statue. Suppose the statue was knocked into a pile of small pieces at time T1 and then that pile of small pieces was reassembled at time T2 into a statue which looks exactly the same in every aspect (even microscopically) as the original one. Call the original statue S1 and the restored one S2. Is S1 identical with S2? (Stories similar to this one have been told in the literature, for instance, *The Ship of Theseus* (Rea 1997). However, owing to the limitation of length, the present writer will quickly put down what he thinks about the issues without engaging in a literature survey. Furthermore, the present writer is more concerned with accommodating the commonsensical thinking and hence may leave some subtle metaphysical issues aside).

Normally we will think that S1 is gone after T1 and that S2 comes into existence after T2. So it might be suggested that by Leibniz's law, S1 cannot be identical with S2. However, such a reading will make "resurrection" logically impossible, which might be too strict.

By our scenario, S1 and S2 share the same physical proper parts. Hence even if we adopt the strict mereological essentialism, which proposes that every proper part of an object is essential to its identity, we will tend to think that S1 and S2 are identical (here we assume that any part of a physical object must also be physical). The strict

mereological essentialism is in effect still too strict to fit in with our conception of identity in the ordinary discourse. For example, a very small piece, say, an atom, of a statue is of course a proper part of it, but normally losing that kind of small part won't change its identity.

Now let's take S1 as a piece of art and ask the same question again. Will we still tend to think with the same confidence that S1 and S2 are identical? It seems that on top of the material constitution, other factors will naturally also come into the scene here. For example, we might take the authorship into account. If the one who did the reassembling is not the original sculptor, we might be less confident in saying that S1 and S2 are identical even though they share the same material constitution. In short, here some historical facts about S1 and S2 might play a role in the issue of identity.

As mentioned above, the strict mereological essentialism is too strict to be tenable. But in any case, some parts of a physical object should be essential to its identity. For instance, if we cut away the upper half of a statue, it will normally be destroyed, which implies that the remaining thing cannot be identical to the original statue. Moreover, even if we repair the statue by putting back a copy of the upper half, which is not the original upper half, so as to make the statue after repair look exactly the same as the original one, we might still think that the statue after repair is not the same as the original one (the point is that a large portion of replacement might affect the identity of an object). This observation suggests that the upper half of a statue might be an essential part of it.

So some proper parts of S1 might be essential to S1's identity when we are only concerned with the material constitution. Those parts of S1 should also be essential to its identity as a piece of art. However, S1 as a piece of art might have more essential parts, for it is possible that some of its parts which are not essential in terms of the material constitution will turn out to be essential to its beauty (or to its aesthetic value) and hence might affect its identity as a piece of art.

## 2. Art Objects Without Physical Parts

Now let's consider a poem. It is certainly not a physical object. Usually, we will think of it as a "type". Of course, in that case, all of its parts are also types. One might argue that the identity of a poem is very sensitive to any change of its parts, that is, even the change of a single word would spoil a poem, and hence the strict mereological essentialism should be the choice here. But this still might not be enough. Suppose

two poets who don't know each other nor each other's works have accidentally written two poems which use the same words and the same sentences and which share the same structure. Even though there is just one type, we might tend to think that there are two poems instead of just one, for the authorship should play a role in determining the identity of a poem.

When it comes to a novel (or a piece of music), the strict mereological essentialism might be untenable, for normally the change of a single word (or a single note) is not essential to its identity. However, similar to the case of physical art objects, some parts will indeed be essential.

In light of mereology, there is an important difference between physical objects and types. Consider the following mereological principle: if every proper part of A is a part of B, then A is a part of B. This principle is true of physical objects (here we assume that two distinct physical objects cannot occupy the same place at the same time) but not of types. A toy counterexample for types is as follows. Consider two sequence types "ab" and "atb". Any proper part of "ab", that is, "a" or "b", is also a part of "atb", but "ab" itself is not a part of "atb". It is also possible that any proper part of a sentence occurs in a novel but the whole sentence never occurs in that novel. Moreover, the following principle should also be true of physical objects. If every proper part of A is a part of B and there is a part of A which is an essential part of B, then A is an essential part of B. But again this is not true of types, because even if a certain proper part of A is an essential part of B, A might not be an essential part of B, for it might not be a part of B, let alone an essential one.

We can talk about the history of a physical object, for it comes into existence at some point of time and ceases to exist at a later point of time (and might come into existence again after that). However, a type as some kind of abstract existence is always there (here let's leave aside the reductionist proposal in which the existence of a type depends on the existence of its tokens) and hence it does not seem to make sense to talk about the history of a type. However, we do talk about the history of a poem or of a novel, but here the history is about "token producing". For instance, what a poet does is to bring a token of the type of a poem into existence and that poet's contribution consists in directing our attention to that type by showing us a token of it. Normally, the author is one who produces the first token.

Moreover, it might not make sense either to talk about changes of parts of a type. A statue might lose a physical part at some moment but a type strictly speaking cannot

lose a part, for again it is always there and never can we cause changes in an abstract object. In this light, the strict mereological essentialism must be true of types. The foregoing remarks might be fine with, say, poems but not good for novels.

Nonetheless, we'd better come up with one story to cover both cases and it goes as follows. We cannot change parts of a type but can access tokens of distinct types. To decide whether a poem or a novel can keep its identity over a change of some of its parts, we actually check a token of a type which is different from the original one in some parts, and then by some criteria we decide whether such a type is "tolerable" in the sense that when accessing a token of it, we would think that we are reading "the same" poem or novel. Formally, in the aforementioned way, we are defining a subclass of types which stands for a poem or a novel. That is, we should rather think of a poem or a novel as a class of types instead of as just one type. When we say that the strict mereological essentialism is true of poems, we actually mean that the class of types which stands for a poem has only one member. It might be difficult to come up with a clear-cut class of types to stand for a novel, for we would probably have to deal with vagueness when defining such a class. But vagueness is a problem haunting a lot of philosophical issues and so we should leave it aside here.

### 3. Concluding Remarks

The main task of this short essay is to look into how changes of parts of a piece of art affect its identity. Here we have considered two categories: physical art objects and art objects without any physical parts. Let's briefly summarize and generalize what have been said above as follows. For a physical art object, its identity might not be determined solely by its material constitution and some historical facts about such an object would have to be considered. Nonetheless, some parts of it might indeed be essential to its identity and some of them being so might be owing to the consideration of the aesthetic properties of that object. The foregoing remarks still apply when it comes to art objects without any physical parts, such as literary works or music. Besides, first we may classify the said kind of art objects as types. However, a type is always there. So in order to make sense of talking about the history of, say, a literary work, we suggest that such a kind of talk should be interpreted as a talk about the history of producing tokens of the type in question. Moreover, a type cannot undergo any change in any of its parts. So in order to accommodate the commonsensical thinking that some literary works can maintain their identity over changes of parts, our proposal is to use a class of types instead of just one type to stand for a literary work and such a class will be defined by assessing tokens of types.

There are some further issues which might be worth looking into. First, there might be some art objects which are mixtures of physical objects and abstract ones. How changes of parts affect the identity of that kind of object might be an interesting issue. Second, even though it is widely thought that the aesthetic value emerges only on the whole object, we can still ask how the parts of an art object contribute to the aesthetic value of that object as a whole or at least we can try to clarify the issue as best we can (indeed we cannot say that the value of an object is just the sum of the values of its parts, but it would also be too quick to say that the value of an object has nothing to do with the values of its parts). Third, similarly we can look into how our aesthetic experience aroused by parts contribute to our aesthetic experience aroused by the whole (for instance, we never listen to a piece of music as a whole but always listen to part after part of it).

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#### Literature

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