

出國報告（出國類別：國際會議）

日本選舉學會研討會(JAES)2016 年學術研討會論文發表報告

服務機關：中正大學政治學系

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派赴國家：日本

出國期間：2016.05.13-2016.05.16

報告日期：2016.05.18

摘要：

本人與政治大學選舉研究中心鄭夙芬研究員以及政治大學政治學系楊婉瑩教授共同撰寫論文，於五月十四日在日本東京的日本大學參加日本選舉研究學會年會，進行論文發表。以下報告內容包括本次出國目的、過程（含中文論文摘要）以及心得。

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目的:

赴日本東京參加日本選舉學會研討會(JAES)2016年學術研討會進行論文發表，論文名稱為”Sensibility and Rationality of Identity in Taiwan”(臺灣認同的感性與理性)，透過調查資料的分析，檢視臺灣民眾對於中國的看法。特別是當認同與現實利益有所衝突時，究竟是選擇堅持台灣認同或是選擇現實利益。

過程:

本論文由本人及政治大學選舉研究中心鄭夙芬研究員以及政治大學政治學系楊婉瑩教授共同合著，本人為主要執筆人。會議議程與會議論文分別列為附件一與附件二。

會議中三位評論人提供了修改意見，包括：研究問題的釐清，所提假設的修正，以及對於研究發現的進一步闡釋等。

論文摘要：

本文使用電話調查資料進行分析，瞭解在臺灣認同大幅成長以及臺灣經濟狀況持續衰退的狀況下，臺灣面對中國的態度為何。我們在調查中使用一個假設性的問題，瞭解民眾是否可能願意為了經濟上的現實利益而放下尊嚴接受中國援助，甚至因此受到中國的影響。

資料分析結果顯示：多數民眾是不願意的。哪些因素影響了民眾對此假設性議題的回應？認同是當中最強的因素，臺灣人認同者不願意接受中國援助。然而，經濟狀況確實有所影響，認為臺灣經濟狀況退化者，較可能接受中國援助。此外，兩個發現值得留意：相對而言，最年輕世代最可能接受中國援助；民主價值也有所影響，顯示台灣與中國在政治體制上的差異於台灣民眾在面對中國時的態度有所影響。

心得及建議:

本次會議，多數論文均為日文發表，因此吸收有限。但，本文評論人也給了相當好的修改建議。同行的台灣學者多為國內進行經驗研究的學界同儕，在會議內外，針對調查研究做了許多討論。對於本系發展網路調查與電話調查提供了許多重要建議，是一個寶貴的經驗。

本校人事室承辦人要求本人寫上本次發表有何吸收新知？基本上，研討會過程中，本人發表論文，由三位評論人提供修改意見，會議結束後，進行修改。稱不上是新知的學習，但對論文修改有所助益。

附件一：會議議程

【第1日】5月14日(土)

◆分科会 A・B・C (10:00～12:00)

【分科会A(政策部会):政党と政策研究のフロンティア】

◇司会者

水戸 克典(日本大学)

◇報告者

河崎 健(上智大学)

「ドイツの政党と政策研究」

富崎 隆(駒澤大学)

「イギリスの政党と政策」

増田 正(高崎経済大学)

「フランスの政党と政策形成」

◇討論者

池谷知明(早稲田大学)・永山博之(広島大学)

【分科会B(制度部会1):民族独立とレファレンダム】

◇司会者

井田正道(明治大学)

◇報告者

渡辺容一郎(日本大学)

「イギリス型レファレンダムについて:党内政治と保守主義の見地から」

末澤恵美(平成国際大学)

「民族の独立とレファレンダムークリミアの事例ー」

浅野和生(平成国際大学)、Ching-Hsin Yu (National Chengchi University)

「議会における与野党対決の代替としての台湾の『公民投票』」

◇討論者

河崎和徳(東北大学)

【分科会C(社会心理部会1):メディアに対する信頼】

◇司会者

小林哲郎(香港城市大学)

◇報告者

稲増一憲(関西学院大学)、三浦麻子(関西学院大学)

「社会調査データを用いたマスメディア不信に関する研究:メディア接触と党派性の観点から」

安野智子(中央大学)

「メディアと民主主義への期待と不信」

萩原 豊(TBS)

「テレビ報道と権力」

◇討論者

前田幸男(東京大学)・竹下俊郎(明治大学)

◆理事会 (12:05~12:55)

◆分科会 D・E・F (13:00~15:00)

【分科会 D(方法論部会):選挙研究における因果推論】

◇司会者

谷口尚子(東京工業大学)

◇報告者

福元健太郎(学習院大学)

「Gender Gap in Voter Turnout by Moon Age: A Circular Data Analysis」

浜中新吾(山形大学)

「阻止条項引き上げと戦略投票」

原田勝孝(政策大学院大学) Smith, M. Daniel(Harvard University)

「The Role of Government Fiscal Transfers on Crime」

◇討論者

飯田 健(同志社大学)・山田恭平(国際大学)

【分科会E(地方部会):大阪都構想とは何だったのか】

◇司会者

石上泰州(平成国際大学)

◇報告者

牛山久仁彦(明治大学)

「特別区の制度と政治」

辻 陽(近畿大学)

「『大阪維新の会』と議会運営—分割政府比較の観点から—」

善教将大(関西学院大学)、宋財沄(神戸大学)

「都構想の何が支持されたのか:コンジョイント分析による政策選好の推定」

◇討論者

名取良太(関西大学)・砂原庸介(大阪大学)

【分科会 F(比較政治部会1):変化する台湾の民意—2016 年総統・立法院同日選挙—】

◇司会者

西川 賢(津田塾大学)

◇報告者

Eric Chen-hua Yu (National Chengchi University), Chao-Chi Lin (National Chengchi University)

「The Transformations of Candidate Selection Methods in Taiwan's Major Political Parties」

Su-feng Cheng (National Chengchi University), Kuang-hui Cheng (National Chung Cheng University), Wan-ying Yang (National Chengchi University)

「Sensibility and Rationality of Identity in Taiwan」

Kah-Yew Lim (National Chengchi University), Chi Huang (National Chengchi University), Ching-Hsin Yu (National Chengchi University)

「Assessment of Cross-Strait Policy and Voting Choices in Taiwan's 2016 Presidential Election」

Ying Lung Chou (Tamkang University), Ching-Hsin Yu (National Chengchi University),
Tsung-Han Tsai (National Chengchi University)
「The Impact of Social Context on Voting Behavior in Taiwan's 2016 Presidential
Election」

◇討論者

石生義人(国際基督教大学)、梅田道生(愛媛大学)、John F. HSIEH (University of
South Carolina)

◆共通論題:「18歳選挙権実施を前にして—その影響と対応—」(15:15~17:45)

◇司会者

岩淵美克(日本大学)

◇報告者

牧之内隆久(明るい選挙推進協会理事長)
「18歳選挙権と主権者教育を巡る問題」

大塚功祐(千葉県立流山おおたかの森高等学校)
「高校生への主権者教育の実践」

五嶋清(産経新聞編集局総務・前政治部長)

林大介(東洋大学)

「18歳選挙権と政治教育—選挙教育における現状と課題の考察—」

◇討論者

川人貞史(東京大学)・小林良彰(慶應義塾大学)

◆総会 (17:45~18:30)

◆懇親会 (19:00~)

【第2日】 5月17日(日)

◆分科会 F・G・H・I・J (9:30～11:30)

【分科会 G(比較政治部会2): 民族性と政治行動、その社会経済的帰結】

◇司会者

浅羽祐樹(新潟県立大学)

◇報告者

中井遼(立教大学)

「選挙戦, 政治意識, 民族性: ラトヴィア 2014 年国政選の DD 分析」

石黒大岳(日本貿易振興機構アジア経済研究所)

「クウェート議会選挙における部族集団の投票行動と分配政治」

鈴木絢女(同志社大学)

「一党優位体制とその後: マレーシアにおける政策争点をめぐる選挙と財政」

◇討論者

建林正彦(京都大学)・鎌原勇太(横浜国立大学)

【分科会 H(制度部会2): 選挙制度と投票】

◇司会者

玉井清(慶應義塾大学)

◇報告者

久保浩樹(ライス大)

「中選挙区制を望むのは誰か? 党内力学と選挙制度改革」

茨木 瞬(東北大学)

「投票時間短縮がもたらす影響に関する一考察」

梅田道生(愛媛大学)

「参院選地方区の不均一な選挙制度が有権者の政治意識や投票行動に与える影響」

◇討論者

竹中佳彦(筑波大学)・森 裕城(同志社大学)

【分科会I(歴史部会):大戦前後の議会と選挙】

◇司会

小南浩一郎(兵庫教育大学)

◇報告者

玉木寛輝(慶應義塾大学)

「昭和戦前期における在郷軍人と選挙」

吉田龍太郎(慶應義塾大学)

「戦後の選挙運動に対する芦田均の取り組み」

竹内 桂(明治大学)

「三木武夫の選挙と支持基盤」

◇討論者

加地直紀(平成国際大学)

【分科会 J(社会心理部会2):現代政治とメディア】

◇司会者

稲増一憲(関西学院大学)

◇報告者

細貝 亮(世論総合研究所)

「メディアの選択制に着目した補強効果の検証」

前嶋和弘(上智大学)

「アメリカの選挙とメディア:急変する選挙戦術と今後」

前田幸男(東京大学)、平野浩(学習院大学)

「マスメディアにおける首相報道の分析」

◇討論者

逢坂 巖(駒澤大学)・今井亮佑(早稲田大学)

◆分科会 K (12:30~14:30)

◇(ポスターセッション):選挙研究のフロンティア

山田 尚武(日本大学)

「ポスト 55 年体制における政治とマスメディア —読売 新聞社説の内容分析—」

三輪 洋文(東京大学)

「Twitter データによる日本の政治家・言論人のイデオロギー位置の推定」

田中 智和(上宮高等学校)

「18 歳選挙権を考えるー現場報告と高 3 政治知識・意識調査からー」

李 柱卿(法政大学)

「自民党中央における政策変更と地方組織の役割」

中村 悦大(愛媛大学)

「IRT による政治的知識水準の指標化と分析」

星健太郎(早稲田大学)

「ランニングを考慮した日本国全議員選挙データベース構築考察」

粕谷祐子(慶應義塾大学)

「Malapportionment and Democracy: A Curvilinear Relationship」

小林哲郎(香港城市大学)、横山智哉(一橋大学)

「政党キューとリーダーキュー:サーベイ実験による比較」

葉山 明(日本大学)

「平成 26 年 4 月 12 日執行の相模原市議会議員選挙において、0.661 票差で小林丈人候補を当選とした当初の判断が取消され、大槻和弘候補を 0.340 票で 逆転当選とした神奈川県選挙管理委員会の裁決が、東京高裁で支持されて事案について、候補者の氏のみが自書された票の按分加算を規定する公選法 68 条の 2 についての考察と私見」

竹本 圭佑(日本学術振興会)

「コミュニケーション行動と報道認知・世論の推測の関係:荒川区社会調査結果から」

内山 卓也(慶應義塾大学)

「合理的な非合理性ー候補者の外見が有権者の投票行動に及ぼす影響についてー」

小野 恵子(国際基督教大学)

「米大統領支持の党派による差の拡大:ブッシュとオバマ政権から見えるもの」

三村 憲弘(武蔵野大学)、深谷健(武蔵野大学)
「高校生への政治教育を実験する ～大学と行政との連携プロジェクトを通じて～」

小椋 郁馬(東京大学)
「米国の選挙における候補者戦略: 広告データを用いた研究」

◆分科会 L・M・N (14:30～16:30)

【分科会 L(社会心理部会 3): 世論の諸相】

◇司会者

西澤由隆(同志社大学)

◇報告者

池田謙一(同志社大学)

「政党の選択許容幅と政治選択の意義の認識: 1997-2013 年の国政選挙」

木村高宏(金沢大学)

「『小さな政府』志向の検討」

境家史郎(東京大学)

「政党間イデオロギー差異と投票参加行動に関する国際比較分析」

◇討論者

山田真裕(関西学院大学)・岡田陽介(立教大学)

【分科会 M(自由論題1)】

◇司会者

堤 英教(香川大学)

◇報告者

澁谷壮紀(東京工業大学)、谷口尚子(東京工業大学)、Chris Whinkler(北海道大学)

「『中位投票者』の変動に関する国際比較—政党公約データを用いたパネルデータ分析—」

勝又裕斗(東京大学)、堀内勇作(Dartmouth College)、鹿毛利枝子(東京大学)

「Victory has a Thousand Fathers, but Defeat is an Orphan: Politically Connected Firms in Japan」

秦 正樹(神戸大学)、横山智也(一橋大学)
「『政治』の何がタブーなのか? :政治的会話の継続性と断絶性の条件」

◇討論者

河野武司(慶應義塾大学)

【分科会N(自由論題2)】

◇司会者

小西徳應(明治大学)

◇報告者

白崎 護(京都大学)

「公職選挙法改正への期待におよぼすインターネット利用の影響」

斉藤英明(洗足学園音楽大学)

「市区長の在職期間が財政支出に与える影響」

上岡 敦(日本大学)

「1958年国会法改正をめぐる政治過程」

◇討論者

奥健太郎(東海大学)・遠藤晶久(高知大学)

Sensibility and Rationality of Identity in Taiwan

Kuang-hui Chen

Department of Political Science, National Chung Cheng University

Su-feng Cheng

Election Study Center, National Chengchi University

Wan-Ying Yang

Department of Political Science, National Chengchi University

Taiwan is a unique case among the third wave of democratization. Because of its complicated relationship with China as well as all the political mobilization before and after democratization, people in this society have been struggling with their identity. Some people call themselves Chinese, others identify themselves as Taiwanese, and still others say that they are both Taiwanese and Chinese. As a result of the antagonism and the various gaps between Taiwan and China, Taiwanese citizens experienced dramatic changes with regard to their identity along with the progress of democratization. The most obvious trend at the aggregate level is that Taiwanese citizens have abandoned the Chinese identity and switched over to the Taiwanese identity, as shown in Figure 1, which presents the changes in the Taiwanese/Chinese identity of people in Taiwan between 1992 and 2015. . The Chinese identity has suffered from a disastrous loss of support from about 25 percent to less than 4 percent, whereas the Taiwanese identity has experienced a steady and rapid expansion from about 18 percent to 60 percent.



Figure 1 Changes in the Taiwanese / Chinese Identity in Taiwan(1991-2015)

If the trend observed in Figure 1 continues, it seems that the problem of divided identity will vanish sooner or later. However, even Taiwanese citizens achieve a consensus on identity, they still have to confront the troublesome situation between Taiwan and China. The observed expansion of Taiwanese identity does not sway China’s claim that Taiwan is part of China, and Taiwan independence movement will trigger China’s employment of military force against Taiwan. Therefore, although the majority of people identify themselves as Taiwanese, only a small portion of them take a pro-independence position. Figure 2 displays the Taiwanese citizens’ unification-independence stances between 1994 and 2015. It is true that the proportion of pro-independence has gradually increased over the two decades. Even so, compared to the dramatic increase in the proportion of Taiwanese identity presented in Figure 1, the increase in pro-independence is relatively unapparent.




Figure 2 Changes in the Unification –Independence Stance in Taiwan(1994-2015)

The discrepancy observed between Figure 1 and Figure 2 indicates Taiwan’s perplexity that while most of the citizens in Taiwan have a clear identity with Taiwan, they defer their movement toward independence, which is likely to induce China to trigger military attacks and economic sanctions against Taiwan. Furthermore, Taiwan has suffered from an awkward transition losing its competitive edge over China in the past two decades. Taiwan was listed as one of the Four Asian Tigers because of its highly developed economy, but also widely recognized as a successful young democracy. People in Taiwan therefore viewed themselves superior to China in a variety of ways. However, while Taiwan’s economy has been becoming stagnant, the rise of China has been recognized by the world. Furthermore, due to the impacts of globalization as well as the improved cross-strait relations since President Ma Ying-jeou assumed power in 2008, Taiwan’s economic dependence on China has been growing. It is commonly believed that China employs economic integration to induce Taiwanese people to change their attitudes toward the issue of unification and independent (Wu 2012, 187). These developments and changes led Taiwan to face a see-saw battle, identity on one side and economic development on the other.

This article is aimed to examine Taiwanese citizens' attitudes toward this dilemma. Given that the majority of Taiwanese citizens have developed their identity with Taiwan, whether they would make a concession in order to reclaim their economic prosperity at the cost of their dignity in the face of China is the main issue addressed in this article. Empirical data are therefore analyzed to see how people come down on one side of the fence or the other. In addition, we propose a series of explanatory factors to account for people's attitudes. Before introducing the data and presenting the results of analysis, literature on economic integration within the European Union (EU) and how people view the rise of China are summarized in order to propose hypotheses to account for Taiwanese citizens' attitudes.

The Choice between Interest and Identity

Interest and identity are the most two important factors adopted in the empirical studies to account for attitudes to European integration (e.g. Allam and Goerres 2011; Balestrini et al. 2011; Garry and Tilley 2009). Some of the studies focuses on the relative power of the two explanatory factors. For example, in their study of Euroscepticism, Abts et al. (2009) propose three approaches to account for Belgians' attitudes toward European integration. First of all, individuals adopt a utilitarian approach to assess the issue of integration. Specifically, people's objective and subjective economic interests at the individual and aggregate level are associated with their evaluation of European integration. Secondly, cultural attachments, which include national identity and social capital, are related to the level of Euroscepticism. People who exclusively identify with their own country and who have lower trust on people from outside of their country are less likely to support European integration. Last, evaluation of domestic government performance and attentiveness to politics are related to attitudes toward EU. People who have negative views on their national politics and those who have less information about politics tend to be reluctant towards European integration.

In addition, some studies established models that combined the two prominent factors and examined the interactions of the two factors to explain peoples' support of European integration. For instance, De Vries and van Kersbergen (2007) combine interest- and identity-based explanatory variables to account for individuals' attitudes toward European integration and their analysis of the Eurobarometer data shows that economic anxiety and exclusive national belonging are negatively correlated with support of EU and European integration.

It is true that both identity and economic satisfaction are necessary elements for individuals to feel secured. What if the people have to make a choice between the two elements? Because of the political hostility between Taiwan and China as well as the concern of economic stagnation, people in Taiwan face the possible trade-off between keeping economic growth by depending on China versus preserving their dignity by asserting their identity distinct from China.

China has drawn attention from the world because of its rapid growth in terms of its economy, military power, and diplomacy. However, people from different parts of the world have different views on China's rise. Chu et al. (2015) examine how China's East Asian neighbors perceive China's rise at the aggregate level. Countries which are closer to China in terms of culture and territory tend to be more aware of China's growing influence. Whereas most of these countries hold a positive view on China's rise, countries which have potential conflicts with China are less likely to do so. Not only do contextual factors at the aggregate level affect people's views toward China's rise, but also the individual-level characteristics matters. In their analysis of the Asian Barometer survey data, Huang and Chu (2015) found that individuals' democratic evaluation of China, economic openness attitudes, liberal orientation, and household economic satisfaction are associated with their image of China.

The above review provides us with possible explanatory variables to account for Taiwanese citizens' attitudes toward the possible dilemma between identity and economic interest. In this study, we apply a hypothetical scenario to examine whether

people in Taiwan will stick with their identity or accept China's aid when running into a difficulty. We adopted the following two questions to capture respondents' attitudes toward the possible dilemma:

If the economic situation in Taiwan becomes very poor at some time in the future, do you agree or disagree that Taiwan accepts mainland China's aid even at the cost of dignity? (Strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree)

For those respondents whose answers are either strongly agree or somewhat agree, the follow-up question would be asked:

If such aid would bring about more influences from mainland upon Taiwan, do you still agree that Taiwan should accept mainland's aid? (Strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree)

In accordance with their responses to the two questions, respondents are classified into three groups: refuse to accept, conditionally agree to accept, and unconditionally agree to accept.

Explanatory Variables

Borrowing insights from the earlier literature review, a series of explanatory variables and hypotheses are proposed to account for Taiwanese respondents' choice between dignity and economic interest. An overview of the exact question wordings of all the variables can be found in Appendix 1

1. *Identity*: Respondents are classified into three groups: Taiwanese, both, and Chinese. It is hypothesized that while those who identify with Taiwan are more likely to refuse aid from China, those who say they are Chinese are more likely to accept aid from China. Those who have dual identity are hypothesized to lie in between. It is interesting to observe the extent to which those who think they are Chinese agree to accept aid from China. If only a small proportion of these people agree to receive aid from China, it is likely that there exists a gap between their

imagined China and their perception of the PRC.

2. *Economy*: It is hypothesized that individuals who are suffering from economic problems and those who think Taiwan has poor economic performance are more willing to agree to accept China's aid. We adopt four economic evaluation questions to measure respondents' perception of past and forthcoming economic performance at the household level and the national level. In addition, at the individual level, we adopt respondents' education and socioeconomic status as the objective and subjective measure of economic status. Specifically, respondents who have a lower level of education and who think they are lower social class are more vulnerable to economic problems, and therefore are more likely to accept China's aid.
3. *Democracy*: Previous studies indicate that political orientations such as ideology and democratic values are associated with attitudes toward European integration and the rise of China (e.g. De Vries and van Kersbergen 2007; Huang and Chu 2015). It is therefore hypothesized that individuals who values democracy are more likely to refuse aid from China in exchange of economic interests.

Because Taiwan has experienced rapid and dramatic political, social, and economic changes in the last decades, individuals growing up during different periods in history have different experiences and hence have different views and values toward politics. We therefore include the concept of political generation into this study to see if people of different generations have different views on the dilemma between identity and economic interests.

Political generation is a concept of importance when tracing the dynamic change of a political system. On the one hand, the formation of political generations is shaped by social conditions, but, on the other hand, the concept of political generations helps to explain a variety of political phenomena. The theory of political generation argues that critical events experienced by individuals during their formative years have persistent impacts upon their subsequent life journeys (Jennings 1987, 368). A

generation is composed of individuals who are affected by the same critical experiences during their formative years, and different critical events taking place at different time points help to shape generations. “Individuals of the same age, they were and are, however, only united as an actual generation insofar as they participate in the characteristic social and intellectual currents of their society and period, and insofar as they have an active or passive experience of the interactions of forces which made up the situations” (Mannheim 1972, 119). The formation of political generations is conditioned by multiple factors. In terms of biological factors, a generation is composed of individuals who were born at about the same period of time. Generations are not formed in a vacuum, however, but within a particular social and cultural environment. Members of one generation share the same experiences, which may be quite distinctive from those experienced by members of the adjacent generations.

The meaning of distinctive experiences of the members of each generation further signifies that the pace of social change of a society is related to the formation of generations within it. It is not easy to identify different generation groups in a static society, because people within a wide age range may have similar experiences, and hence boundaries between generations may seem extremely vague or may be absent. By contrast, we are more likely to identify different generations in a society experiencing rapid social changes, as the rapidly changing environment results in quite distinctive experiences resulting in clear borderlines between generations. In terms of generation formation, the tempo of social change is important (Mannheim 1972, 124-128). In sum, in addition to individuals’ dates of birth, the social environment as well as the pace of change determine the phenomena of political generations.

The theories of political generations have been elaborated and tested against empirical evidence in the last few decades, and have embodied Mannheim’s idea of generation. Mannheim did not explicitly clarify the definition of formative years, but vaguely

described this period as “the point where personal experimentation with life begins—round about the age of 17, sometimes a little earlier and sometimes a little later” (115), and this process usually ends at about the mid-twenties. Socialization theories hold that an individual’s basic personality “tends to be crystallized by the time an individual reaches adulthood, with relatively little change thereafter” (Inglehart 1981, 881). Researchers usually refer to the formative years as the stages of both preadult and early adult periods (e.g., Sears and Levy 2003, 84). In this study, we use birth year and occurrence of critical events to divide the respondents into five political generations.

4. Political Generation: In this study, we use birth year and occurrence of critical *events* to divide the respondents into 4 political generations as follows.

Generation 1 (born before 1949) is composed of individuals who were under the rule of Japan or had lived in mainland China before moving to Taiwan.

Generation 2 (born between 1950 and 1968) refers to those who were growing up under the authoritarian ruling of the KMT before they became adults.

Generation 3 (born between 1969 and 1977) are those who experienced the KMT’s authoritarian ruling during their childhood, but participated in the beginning of democratic transition when they were turning into adulthood.

Generation 4 (born after 1978) are the youngest cohort who never had any authoritarian experiences in their life.

It is not easy to propose a clear-cut hypothesis regarding political generations’ responses to the possible dilemma between identity and economic interests. For the older generations, they were educated during the authoritarian period and learned a lot of negative views on China. It seems that they were more likely to insist on the distinctiveness between Taiwan and China. On the other hand, they also had the experiences of economic insecurity during their earlier life stage, so it is also reasonable for them to run after economic prosperity. The younger generations, however, have the opposite experiences, compared to the older generation. They grew

up with abundance and were not particularly brainwashed to learn about China from a negative perspective. Therefore, it is possible that the young generations will value their own identity more than economic interest in accordance with the arguments of post-materialism. However, it is also possible for them to take a more objective viewpoint to view China, so they may differ from the older generation with regard to how they perceive the hypothetical aid from China.

Data

In this study, we analyze a telephone survey data set to examine respondents' attitudes toward the possible dilemma between economic interests and identity. This telephone survey was conducted in January 2016. The survey population comprised all citizens in Taiwan, and a nationally representative list of landline phone numbers was adopted to contact the respondents. Prior to the interview, the number of adults living in each household was ascertained before randomly selecting one of the adults, if there were more than one, as the selected respondents. The selected respondents were invited to participate in the interview, and 1961 respondents were successfully interviewed in this survey.

Findings

The dependent variable in this study is whether Taiwanese citizens would accept China's aid in order to deal with economic problem at the cost of Taiwan being affected by China. The result shows that the majority of respondents (66.6%) directly refuses this option.¹ They disagree to receive assistance from China when Taiwan is in trouble. The rest of the respondents (33.4%) tend to accept China's aid. While 20.4% of them remains their positive response unchanged even though Taiwan will be affected by China as a result of receiving China's aid, 13.3% of them change their minds and become reluctant to accept China's aid.

¹ Among the 1961 respondents, 402 of them (20.5%) are excluded from analysis because of their non-response toward this question.

It is clear that most of the respondents prefer preserving their dignity in the face of China. In addition to demographic variables, we propose three individual level explanatory factors, including identity, economic interests, and political generation, to account for people's attitudes toward the trade-off between the dignity associated with Taiwanese identity versus economic prosperity. The analysis starts with bivariate analysis before conducting multivariate analysis. The results are listed in Table 1.

Most of these explanatory variables are significantly associated with attitude toward aid from China. While men are more willing to receive aid from China with the possibility of being affected by China, women are less willing to do so. On the one hand, well-educated individuals, the youngest generation, people having Chinese and dual identities, individuals who think the economic condition being improved at the national and the household level, and those who do not believe democracy being the best political system are relatively more willing to receive China's assistance. On the other hand, people who do not have a high school diploma, the two older generations, those who exclusively identify with Taiwan, individuals who think the economic performance becoming worse than before, and people who have unconditional trust in democracy are particularly unwilling to accept aid from China in order to maintain Taiwan's economic development.

Respondents' subjective social class and their prospective evaluation of economic situation have nothing to do with their attitude toward the hypothetical scenario. Respondents do take economic interest into consideration when facing the complicated relationship with China, but they adopt only retrospective evaluation in this decision process. Furthermore, opposite from our hypothesis that those who perceive the poor economic performance are more likely to overlook the side effects of receiving aid from China, they are more likely to reject the China's aid than those who think the economy being well.

Table 1 Acceptance of Aid from China

		Refusal	Conditional Acceptance	Unconditional Acceptance	Total	
Sex	Male	532(66.7%)	88 (11.0%)	178 (22.3%)	798 (100%)	X ² =8.978 df=2 p<.05
	Female	502(65.9%)	119 (15.6%)	141 (18.5%)	762 (100%)	
	Total	1034(66.3%)	207 (13.3%)	319 (20.4%)	1560(100%)	
Education	Primary or below	125(75.3%)	20(12.0%)	21(12.7%)	166(100%)	X ² =27.576 df=10 p<.05
	Junior high school	146(73.7%)	29(14.6%)	23(11.6%)	198(100%)	
	Senior high/ Vocational school	298(66.1%)	54(12.0%)	99(22.0%)	451(100%)	
	Technology college	137(64.9%)	28(13.3%)	46(21.8%)	211(100%)	
	University	253(61.6%)	64(15.6%)	94(22.9%)	411(100%)	
	Post-graduate	70(59.8%)	13(11.1%)	34(29.1%)	117(100%)	
	Total	1029(66.2%)	208(13.4%)	317(20.4%)	1554(100%)	
Generation	Generation 1	118(74.2%)	17(10.7%)	24(15.1%)	159(100%)	X ² =35.912 df=6 p<.001
	Generation 2	389(71.4%)	56(10.3%)	100(18.3%)	545(100%)	
	Generation 3	183(65.1%)	27(9.6%)	71(25.3%)	281(100%)	
	Generation 4	328(59.0%)	105(18.9%)	123(22.1%)	556(100%)	
	Total	1018(66.1%)	205(13.3%)	318(20.6%)	1541(100%)	
Social Class	Upper	13(59.1%)	4(18.2%)	5(22.7%)	22(100%)	X ² =7.34. df=8 p=.500
	Upper middle	115(63.9%)	20(11.1%)	45(25.0%)	180(100%)	
	Middle	488(64.2%)	113(14.9%)	159(20.9%)	760(100%)	
	Lower middle	230(67.4%)	50(14.7%)	61(17.9%)	341(100%)	
	Lower	104(66.7%)	16(10.3%)	36(23.1%)	156(100%)	
	Total	950(65.1%)	203(13.9%)	306(21.0%)	1459(100%)	
Identity	Taiwanese	770(77.9%)	110(11.1%)	109(11.0%)	989(100%)	X ² =188.007 df=4 p<.001
	Both	235(46.0%)	89(17.4%)	187(36.6%)	511(100%)	
	Chinese	18(41.9%)	5(11.6%)	20(46.5%)	43(100%)	
	Total	1023(66.3%)	204(13.2%)	316(20.5%)	1543(100%)	
Economy: Household Retrospective	Much Better	7(50.0%)	3(21.4%)	4(28.6%)	14(100%)	X ² =24.962 df=8 p<.05
	Better	41(53.9%)	18(23.7%)	17(22.4%)	76(100%)	
	The Same	631(64.1%)	143(14.5%)	211(21.4%)	985(100%)	
	Somewhat Worse	235(73.4%)	32(10.0%)	53(16.6%)	320(100%)	
	Much Worse	113(72.9%)	11(7.1%)	31(20.0%)	155(100%)	
	Total	1027(66.3%)	207(13.4%)	316(20.4%)	1550(100%)	

Economy: Household Prospective	Much Better	19(63.3%)	3(10.0%)	8(26.7%)	30(100%)	X ² =5.890 df=8 p=.660
	Better	105(66.0%)	27(17.0%)	27(17.0%)	159(100%)	
	The Same	626(65.1%)	137(14.2%)	199(20.7%)	962(100%)	
	Somewhat Worse	117(65.7%)	21(11.8%)	40(22.5%)	178(100%)	
	Much Worse	57(70.4%)	7(8.6%)	17(21.0%)	81(100%)	
	Total	924(65.5%)	195(13.8%)	291(20.6%)	1410(100%)	
Economy: Taiwan Retrospective	Much Better	1(20.0%)	1(20.0%)	3(60.0%)	5(100%)	X ² =69.901 df=8 p<.001
	Better	13(44.8%)	6(20.7%)	10(34.5%)	29(100%)	
	The Same	243(54.2%)	73(16.3%)	132(29.5%)	448(100%)	
	Somewhat Worse	299(68.6%)	71(16.3%)	66(15.1%)	436(100%)	
	Much Worse	462(74.4%)	55(8.9%)	104(16.7%)	621(100%)	
	Total	1018(66.1%)	206(13.4%)	315(20.5%)	1539(100%)	
Economy: Taiwan Prospective	Much Better	11(61.1%)	3(16.7%)	4(22.2%)	18(100%)	X ² =14.833 df=8 p=.062
	Better	101(71.1%)	14(9.9%)	27(19.0%)	142(100%)	
	The Same	411(64.7%)	101(15.9%)	123(19.4%)	635(100%)	
	Somewhat Worse	200(64.5%)	31(10.0%)	79(25.5%)	310(100%)	
	Much Worse	125(61.3%)	25(12.3%)	54(26.5%)	204(100%)	
	Total	848(64.8%)	174(13.3%)	287(21.9%)	1309(100%)	
Democracy	Prefer Democracy	645(70.1%)	133(14.5%)	142(15.4%)	920(100%)	X ² =47.931 df=2 p<.001
	Dictatorship/ no difference	274(56.1%)	62(12.7%)	152(31.1%)	488(100%)	
	Total	919(65.3%)	195(13.8%)	294(20.9%)	1408(100%)	

Because of the dependent variable is an ordinal variable, an ordered logit model is estimated, and the results are listed in Table 2. After taking all the variables into consideration, the results are quite different from those in Table 1. Only four variables remains significantly associated with people's choice between economic interests and dignity. It is not surprising that Taiwanese identity are negatively related to possibility of accepting aid from China. In addition, democratic legitimacy also decreases the possibility to accept China's aid. Two significant relationships are unanticipated. One is that the youngest generation is relatively more willing to receive assistance from China in order to overcome the trouble in Taiwan. The other is that retrospective economic evaluation is negatively associated with the choice between dignity and economic interest.

Table 2 Determinants of Accepting Aid from Chia

Explanatory Variables	Ordered Logit Coefficient	Standard Error
Sex (Male=0)		
Female	.187	.128
Education (Primary=0)		
Junior High	-.268	.315
Senior High/Vocational School	-.184	.268
Tech. College	-.252	.297
University	.006	.290
Post-graduate	.071	.336
Generation (Generation 1=0)		
Generation 2	-.027	.213
Generation 3	.071	.255
Generation 4	.548*	.252
Social Class (Middle=0)		
Upper	.253	.480
Upper Middle	-.032	.185
Lower Middle	.140	.166
Lower	.460	.238
Economic Evaluation		
Household Retrospective (1-5)	.032	.087
Household Prospective (1-5)	.038	.035
Taiwan Retrospective (1-5)	-.242***	.067
Taiwan Prospective (1-5)	-.009	.028
Identity (Both=0)		
Taiwanese	-1.40***	.137
Chinese	.581	.334
Democracy (Dictatorship/No Diff.=0)		
Democracy Preferable	-.531***	.132
Cut1	-.834	.409
Cut2	-.087	.408
χ^2		217.75
Pseudo R ²		0.100
N		1257

Conclusion

This study adopts a hypothetical scenario to examine whether Taiwanese citizens are rational or sensible when facing to the issue of China's rise. Similar to Wu's finding (2005), it is found in this analysis that identity remains a powerful variable account for people's attitudes toward China. This leads us to the conclusion that people in Taiwan are sensible when encountering the issue of identity. However, economic interests does matter. Although their perception of household level economic performance is not related to their attitudes toward China, those who have a negative evaluation of Taiwan's retrospective economic performance are more reluctant to receive China's aid. It is possible that these people attribute the worsening of economic condition in Taiwan to China's expansion, which cause the fall of exports and the loss of job opportunities, and therefore they are more determined to reject the aid from China.

However, two findings are also worth noting. First, the youngest generation are different from their older counterparts. Different from the older generations taking a sensible perspective to preserve their dignity resulting from identity, the youngest generation are more rational and therefore are more likely to face the issue of identity in a more practical way than by sticking to identity. Furthermore, democratic values are significantly related to how people deal with the identity issue. Therefore, whether China would transform its political system to a democratic one would affects the interaction between Taiwan and China.

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Appendix

Variable	Questionnaire	Response Items
Identity	In Taiwan, some people think they are Taiwanese. There are also some people who think that they are Chinese. Do you consider yourself as Taiwanese, Chinese or both?	Taiwanese Both Chinese
Economic Evaluation: Household Retrospective	Would you say that over the past year, your own household's economic condition has gotten better, stayed about the same, or gotten worse?	Gotten much better Gotten somewhat better Stayed the same Gotten somewhat worse Gotten much worse
Economic Evaluation: Household Prospective	Would you say that in the forthcoming year, your own household's economic condition will get better, stay about the same, or get worse?	Get much better Get somewhat better Stay the same Get somewhat worse Get much worse
Economic Evaluation: Taiwan Retrospective	Would you say that over the past twelve months, the state of the economy in Taiwan has gotten much better, gotten somewhat better, stayed about the same, gotten somewhat worse, or gotten much worse?	Gotten much better Gotten somewhat better Stayed the same Gotten somewhat worse Gotten much worse
Economic Evaluation: Taiwan Prospective	Would you say that in the forthcoming year, the state of the economy of Taiwan will get better, stay about the same, or get worse?	Get much better Get somewhat better Stay the same Get somewhat worse Get much worse
Social Class	If we divide social class to upper, upper middle, middle, lower middle and lower, which do you think you are?	Upper Upper middle Middle Lower middle Lower
Democracy	While some people say that democracy is preferable to any other kind of regime, others say that in some circumstances, an authoritarian regime – a dictatorship can be preferable to a democratic system. Which statement do you agree with?	Democracy Preferable Dictatorship/No difference
Education	What is your highest level of education?	Primary School or below Junior High Senior High/Vocational School Technical College University Post-graduate Education