

出國報告（出國類別：進修）

赴美國加州大學聖地牙哥分校  
進修國際事務高等研究報告

服務機關：外交部

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## 壹、摘要：

99年7月調部返國服務之際，在一偶然機會下，看到「行政院選送優秀公務人員100年赴國外進修計畫」之公文傳閱，此一計畫係行政院為多元培訓公務人才及因應國家建設發展所需，將停辦18年的「選送中高階公務人員赴國外進修學位」之機制恢復辦理，本人爰把握機會申請並獲服務機關之推薦，嗣經兩階段甄審，終由時任行政院吳院長敦義於同年10月核定共13名赴國外攻讀碩博士學位之優秀公務人員。本人有幸獲選，隨即著手準備托福考試、申請美國研究所以及辦理相關出國手續事宜。

本人申請就讀的是美國加州大學聖地牙哥分校(UCSD)國際關係暨太平洋研究學院(IR/PS)之國際事務高等研究碩士(MAS-IA)專班，此一為期十個月之碩士課程甚為緊湊，必須修滿12門課(3門必修，9門選修)共計48學分之課程始能畢業。在100年9月至101年6月期間，本人修習包括國際政治與國家政策制定(The Politics of International and National Policy Making)、太平洋區域經濟(Economies of the Pacific Rim)、國際政治與安全(International Politics and Security)、綠色科技(Green Technology)、美中關係(U.S.-China Relations)、太平洋國際關係(International Relations of the Pacific)、中國經濟暨社會發展(Economic and Social Development of China)、國際環境政策與政治(International Environmental Policy and Politics)、太平洋週邊區域政策(Policy in the Pacific Rim)、中國經商(Doing Business in China)、政府與法制(Government and Regulation)及東南亞經濟發展議題(Topics in Economic Development in Southeast Asia)等12門課程。

雖在外交職場歷經10多年的磨練，但重返校園的心情依然忐忑，尤其美國研究所的上課方式，教授於每堂課前指定大量閱讀並課堂上隨時點名抽問，以及課業繁重程度著實令人感到壓力。然而在這樣一個緊羅密鼓的震撼教育下，終究還是挺過來了。過程中或有甘苦，但重要的是，此一紮實的學習過程以及國外的生活體驗彷彿讓一顆電力不足的電池重新充電飽和，也讓人找到重新出發的方向與力量。

謹藉此感謝行政院及本人所屬服務機關提供本人此一出國深造之機會，未來定將學以致用、發揮所長、貢獻所學。



## 貳、研究動機與目的：

### 一、增進專業知能，提升競爭力

身為公務人員，尤其是在相同的職場服務多年以來，很容易安逸於現狀，倘不主動追求充實自我，久而久之即失去競爭力。因此，重返校園及從事學術研究便成為增進專業知能的有效途徑之一。加州大學聖地牙哥分校（UCSD）國際關係暨太平洋研究學院（IR/PS）提供學生許多增進專業知能的選項，不論是在主修或選修課程，可橫跨國際政治、國際經濟、國際安全及國際環境政策等專業領域。當然其中部分科目的專業理論或曾在國內大學及研究所修習過，惟國際關係議題隨時間演變而有所不同，重新溫習國際關係理論以及學習新的專業知能及工具，均有助於瞭解、分析及推斷國際情勢的發展。此外，IR/PS 研究所每學季均舉辦多場學術研討會以及邀請知名講座演講，提供學生智識增長及意見交流的機會。透過與國際關係領域相關議題的廣泛瞭解、專業領域的深入研究以及學習新的分析工具，無形中可強化個人的專業知能，提升其本身及對外競爭力。

### 二、強化前瞻及創新思考，培養國際觀

誠如本人前述，公務人員倘習於現狀，在原有崗位上日復一復地工作，不追求創新改變，不但本身思考能力會逐漸退化，對服務單位亦是一大損害。筆者認為，唯有跳脫即有的框架，嚐試轉換不同的跑道，藉由外在環境的刺激，方能強化前瞻及創新的思考模式。而在校園從事學術研究的一大好處是，學術畢竟與實務不同，可藉由多面向的假設情境，激發創新思考，並透過不斷地實驗與討論過程而獲致定理與結論。IR/PS 研究所提供學生一個創新思考的平台，藉由此一平台，師生在互動教學及研習過程中，激發創新思考及產出，同時可培養不同的國際觀，而此恰可彌補國際關係領域實務經驗之不足。

### 三、廣結善緣，厚植人脈

由於本人從事涉外事務，經常於海外內服務，能與各國優秀教授及駐外人員結識並建立情誼，亦是赴海外深造的主要動機之一。在 UCSD 的 IR/PS 研究所內，得以認識許多來自不同專業領域的教授及學生，有些教授曾在美國政府部門擔任要



職，一半以上的國際事務高等研究碩士(MAS-IA)專班同學服務於各國公家機關，另有部分同學在知名跨國企業工作，故在此為期近一年的進修的過程中，能與渠等建立友誼，誠屬難能可貴。

#### 四、發揮所長，學以致用

本人選擇申請出國進修的動機之一，源自有感於自身之不足，以及在外交職場上工作多年後，亟須跳脫原有的框架以找尋新的方向與力量，於是重新體驗研究生的生活。然而任何的在職進修終須回歸到實務層面方具意義，而當初選擇與工作領域相符之國際關係研究所做為進修地點，旨盼有朝一日能將所學運用在實務上，同時對我國當前的外交工作貢獻己力。

### 參、研習過程：

#### 一、加州大學聖地牙哥分校(UCSD)及國際關係暨太平洋研究(IR/PS)簡介

UCSD成立於1960年，為加州大學分校之一，位於美國第五大城聖地牙哥市的La Jolla，是加州大學佔地最大的分校。UCSD在學術領域上表現亮眼，曾出過16位諾貝爾獎得主，在2011年全美國公立大學中排行第七。UCSD秉持「在地精神、放眼全球」的理想，是一所研究型的高等學府。

UCSD設有有數十個學科專業，大部分具有極強的教學及研究實力，可授予碩士、博士學位，其中幾項專業領域居全美前十位：生物工程、政治科學、神經學、細胞生物學、生物醫學、歌劇和舞蹈等。學校擁有一流的研究及教學設施，設有音樂研究中心、地球和行星物理學研究中心、海洋資源研究中心、癌症研究中心、海洋學院、國際關係學院、太平洋研究學院、醫學院等研究學院。

#### 二、進修計畫內容

因工作領域之故，本人一開始即鎖定申請攻讀國際關係碩士學位課程，而美國許多知名學府均設有國際事務高等研究，例如位於東岸Harvard大學、Yale大學、



Colombia大學、George Washington大學、George Town大學、Johns Hopkins大學及Princeton大學等，其國際關係研究所均名列全美前幾名。然而在太平洋專業研究、聖地牙哥宜人氣候、以及行政院提供國外進修計畫預算限制等三項因素綜合考量下，本人最後選擇就讀加州大學聖地牙哥分校國際關係暨太平洋研究學院(IR/PS)的國際事務高等研究碩士(MAS-IA)專班。

UCSD的IR/PS提供碩、博士學位課程，根據2012年全美國際關係研究所排名，該校IR/PS博士課程排名全美第七名，碩士課程則排名第15，足見具有一定的學術水準。而IR/PS碩士課程又分為一年制及兩年制，一年制是針對具有五年以上相關領域工作經驗社會人士開設專班，二年制則是提供予大學應屆畢業生或有心專研密集專業課程之人士。本人所唸之國際事務高等研究碩士(MAS-IA)專班，研究生又必須在四大專業主軸(Career Track)，即國際關係(International Relations)、國際政治經濟(International Political Economy)、國際公共政策(International Public Policy)、環境政策及永續發展(Environmental Policy and Sustainability)選擇其中，另在包括中國、日本、韓國、東南亞及拉丁美洲等五大區域研究(Regional Studies)選擇其中一項做為其專業研究領域。

UCSD的學制為學季制(Quarter)，一年共三個學季，分為秋季班(Fall Quarter)冬季班(Winter Quarter)及春季班(Spring Quarter)，每個學季為期僅短短十週。IR/PS的國際事務高等研究碩士(MAS-IA)專班一年制課程其實為期不到10個月，但課程相當緊湊密集，在3個學季內要修滿48個學分，修滿12門課程始能畢業。而這12門課程當中，其中3門為必修課程，另外3門須與個人所選專業主軸(Career Track)相關，2門與區域研究相關，其餘4門則可任選其他有興趣的課程。UCSD的國際關係暨太平洋研究學院(IR/PS)的MAS-IA專班課程相當繁重，倘與美國約翰霍普金斯大學高等國際研究學院(The School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), the Johns Hopkins University)須在一年內修滿8門課程相較起來，IR/PS的要求確實較為嚴格，而教授們嚴謹的教學態度也令人欽佩。

在此本人要特別介紹的是，由於MAS-IA專班是提供予具有五年以上相關領域工作經驗的社會人士就讀，因此學生組成分子亦相當多元。本人所唸MAS-IA專班計有25名學生，其中12人為外國籍人士，其他13名為美國公民及擁有美國永久居留權之



人士。這25名學生當中，有半數為各國政府部門官員，且均為公費帶職進修人員，其中3名為美國防部及軍事單位人員，韓國外交部2名外交人員，新加坡國防部2名中階官員，日本經濟部、農業部及基礎建設共3名官員，本人是班上唯一一位台灣公職人員，其餘則是在美國各行各業任職人士，或是在進修此一研究課程的同時，尋求更佳就業機會的社會人士。

此外，IR/PS研究所約有33- 35位專任及兼任教授，在其招生簡冊中特別介紹五位區域研究中心主任，包括：(1) 墨西哥籍教授Alberto Diaz-Cayeros，具有美國Duke University博士學位，為目前UCSD美墨研究中心主任；(2) Richard Feinberg教授，Stanford University博士班畢業，為UCSD亞太經濟合作(APEC)研究中心主任以及全球領導學院(Global Leadership Institute)主任，曾任職美國國安會；(3) Stephen Haggard教授，負責規劃MAS-IA專班課程，加州柏克萊大學博士，亦為韓國及太平洋區域研究中心主任；(4) 日籍Takeo Hoshi 教授，麻省理工學院(MIT)博士，太平洋經濟合作及國際經濟關係首席教授；(4) Barry Naughton教授，Yale University博士，專攻中國研究；(5) Susan Shirk(謝淑麗)教授，MIT博士，全球衝突與合作中心主任以及Ho Miu Lam中心中國及太平洋關係研究首席教授，曾於1997- 2000年柯林頓政府期間擔任亞太副助卿，對美中台關係有深入獨特見解。

### 三、選修課程

本人在 UCSD 的國際關係及太平洋國際學院(IR/PS)研習過程歷經三個階段：(一) 秋季班 (二) 冬季班 (三) 春季班。共修習十二門課程，包括國際政治與國家政策制定(Politics of International and National Policy Making)、太平洋區域經濟(Economies of the Pacific Rim)、國際政治與安全(International Politics and Security)、綠色科技(Green Technology)、美中關係(U.S.-China Relations)、太平洋國際關係(International Relations of the Pacific)、中國經濟暨社會發展(Economic and Social Development of China)、國際環境政策與政治(International Environmental Policy and Politics)、太平洋週邊區域政策(Workshop on Policy Issues in the Pacific Rim)、中國經商(Doing Business in China)、政府與法制(Government and Regulation)及東南亞經濟發展議題(Topics in Economic Development in Southeast



Asia)。以下分別依各學季所修的課程重點逐一摘述：

(一) 秋季班 (100 年 9 月 19 日至 12 日 10 日)：在為期 10 週的秋季班期間，本人所修四門課程 (前兩門為必修，後兩門為選修，每門課 4 學分，共計 16 學分) 如下：

1. 國際政治與國家政策制定 (The Politics of International and National Policy Making) 由 Matthew Shugart、Ellis Krauss、Susan Shirk、Barbara Walter 及 Miles Kahler 等 5 位教授依不同主題輪流授課，內容涵蓋比較政治機構暨政策制定、衝突及戰爭、國際金融組織 (IMF、WTO)、區域組織 (EU、ASEAN、APEC) 以及亞太國際關係等。

由於選舉制度攸關國家民主政治發展，惟目前各種選舉制度未臻完善且存有不同程度之缺失，對國家政策制定及國際政治均產生若干影響，而一個理想的選舉制度必須能夠充分反映民意，以期更能符合民主精神，因此許多民主國家紛紛跟進採用較新之選舉制度。爰 Matthew Shugart 及 Ellis Krauss 二位教授特別針對當前各國選舉制度加以介紹，分析印度及墨西哥兩國之行政與立法部門間的關係，以及對日本及紐西蘭的選舉制度改革進行案例研究。

Susan Shirk 教授為中國研究專家，伊講述中國大陸現階段政治架構及決策機制，並就該決策機制對中國外交政策制定的影響進行深入探討。由於中國共產極權政府架構龐大，中央政府下設 3 至 4 級地方政府，然而自鄧小平時代起為爭取地方政府之支持，爰授權地方政府行使若干權力，但往往在中央發號施令下，形成「上有政策下有對策」之弊端。而中國領導人多半出身地方省級書記，亦是地方權力擴張的原因之一。另外中國領導人的產生方式相當特別教授，Shirk 教授稱之為「相互責任制」(Reciprocal Accountability)，此一方式迫使領導人向各方勢力妥協以爭取支持。

Barbara Walter 教授專研國際衝突與戰爭，條理分明，邏輯清晰，尤其演繹歸納能力極強，分析國際間行為者 (含國家及非國家主體) 決策模式，甚具說服力。伊針對戰爭本質進行解說，舉美國兩次波灣戰爭決策過程以及軍事行動戰略及其所造成之影響進行精闢分析。此外，亦針對北韓及伊朗發展核子武器問題，以及美國、以色列、中國及北韓在此一事件中所扮演之角色及立場在課



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堂間與學生進行討論。

Miles Kahler 教授則就當前最重要之全球性國際組織如聯合國 (UN)、國際貨幣基金 (IMF) 及世界貿易組織 (WTO) 等進行講授，另對區域性國際組織如 APEC、EU、ASEAN 等發展趨勢加以分析。然而無論是全球或區域性國際組織，均存在無法完全約束管制其會員國的問題。因此 Kahler 教授也特別提到各國在洽簽自由貿易協定同時，對於人權紀錄不彰的國家，歐美等國家會要求開發中國家先行改善人權及勞工環境及待遇，才會進一步提供貿易優惠條件。

這堂由五位教授輪流授課的課程，在短時間內必須廣泛閱讀並瞭解上揭相關國際政治議題，師生間充分進行討論及交換意見。另本人亦針對教授指定專題共完成六份個人報告，每篇字數約 1,000 至 2,000 字不等，除了對相關議題有更深一層之認識與瞭解外，在英文寫作技巧方面亦略有進步。

2. 太平洋區域經濟(Economies of the Pacific Rim)：由 Takeo Hoshi、Joshua Graff Zivin 及 Gordon Hanson 等 3 位教授依不同主題輪流授課，內容包括國際金融市場(匯兌、國際收支)、市場經濟學(供給及需求、市場失靈、福利經濟學、公共財及外部財)、環境經濟學(碳捕捉及碳交易、政府對環境污染管制政策)及國際貿易原理等。

此門課的第一大主題國際金融市場原理由 Takeo Hoshi 教授主講，除講授國際匯兌及國際收支外，並針對 2010 年全球金融危機成因及美國政府所採取因應措施進行探討。由於當前國際經濟社會各國間之互賴程度日益緊密，一旦發生金融危機則危及全球各經濟體，此次金融危機使各國政府深切體認，惟有善加運用相關國際金融機制，相互訂定合作協定及規範，同時採取較為嚴謹之金融管制措施，使各金融機構遵守相關金融規定，方能有效杜絕金融危機之發生。

第二大主題市場經濟學係由 Joshua Graff Zivin 教授講授，內容涵蓋市場供給及需求、市場失靈、福利經濟學、公共財及外部財等重點。Zivin 教授特別舉出各國在追求經濟發展同時卻衍生環境污染問題，該環境污染有時並非單一國家的問題，而是演變成跨國環境污染問題，例如在全球化的浪潮下，跨國企業紛赴成本較低之開發中國家設廠，生產過程中造成空氣及水源等污染情形。由於環保議題已引起各國政府之重視，如何制定有效的環境污染管制政策，專家們也紛紛研提許多防止環



境污染的作法，其中碳捕捉(Carbon Capture)及碳交易(Carbon Trade)已成為目前廣泛討論之課題。

第三大主題國際貿易原理則由 Gordon Hanson 教授講授，針對相對優勢理論及生產可能界線等問題進行分析，並就全球化對貿易之影響、各國貿易政策及貿易障礙等問題進行探討。值得注意的是，全球化並非對所有國家都產生正面之影響，有些競爭力較弱的國家可能未蒙其利卻已深受其害，例如該等國家的部分產業因全球市場開放之故，迫使這些產業面臨嚴峻衝擊甚至關閉的命運。

此門課短短十週內講授涵蓋總體經濟學及個體經濟學，內容可謂相當廣泛，本人因缺乏經濟背景，對部分經濟學專有名詞及理論並不熟悉，課堂上頗感吃力，經常得於課前課後上網查詢相關經濟學知識及理論，以增進瞭解。此外，學測方式由 3 位授課教授出題考試，題目雖與上揭授課內容相關，惟甚為靈活，須對經濟學及國際經濟現勢有充分瞭解始能獲取高分。

3. 國際政治與安全(International Politics and Security)：由學者 Barbara Walter 授課，以阿拉伯之春、兩次波斯灣戰爭、古巴飛彈危機、台海危機、北韓及伊朗核武發展等實際案例，探討國家間戰爭、內戰、核武擴散、恐怖主義、民主化及政治發展等。W 教授要求學生繳交 7 篇不同主題之 memo 報告，平均每星期 1 篇，課程雖甚繁重，惟議題包羅萬象，本人亦從中學習到分析國際政治工具及寫作技巧，獲益良多。
4. 綠色科技(Green Technology)：此門課除由教授 Joshua Graff Zivin 介紹綠色能源如太陽能、風力發電、生質能、地熱等概念外，另邀請 7 名政府及業界講座主講當前綠能發展，其中包括加州永續能源計畫主任 McAllister 講授“電網及替代能源政策”及聖地牙哥 SDGE 電力公司經理 Haddow 介紹“電動車發展”等。此外，在美國所有大學中，UCSD 對綠色能源應用執行成效顯著，爰本門課亦安排學生參觀校內太陽能發電、智慧電網及電動車充電站等綠能設施。

(二) 冬季班 (101年1月9日至3日24日)：在為期10週的冬季班期間，本人修習四門課程 (均為選修，每門課4學分，共計16學分) 如下：



1. 美中關係(U.S.-China Relations)：由 Susan Shirk(謝淑麗)教授主講。謝教授曾於柯林頓政府期間(1997-2000)擔任亞太副助卿，主管中國、台灣、香港及蒙古等地區事務，深諳美中台關係之發展與影響。此門課分七大主題探討：美中關係正常化(從尼克森總統訪中至美中建交)、美國如何回應中國崛起及大戰略、美國及中國在亞洲佈局、中國內政及外交策略、台灣議題、美中經貿關係、軍事暨安全議題與危機處理。由於 2011 年 1 月 14 日適逢我國總統及立法委員選舉，謝教授曾要求包括本人在內之台灣學生就各政黨總統候選人及大選情形表示意見，讓在座其他同學對台灣政情有更深一層之認識。此外，此門課除規定繳交四份短篇(3-4 頁)書面報告外，並於 3 月 6 日舉行即時模擬(simulation)釣魚台衝突事件，由同學分飾日本、中國及美國各方之不同角色，現場進行危機處理演練。

2. 太平洋國際關係(International Relations of the Pacific)：由 Miles Kahler 教授授課。此門課自亞太地區範疇界定、太平洋歷史及近代國際政治演變、強權與結盟關係、以及經濟整合與組織等面向切入分析；內容涵蓋中日韓等東亞國家之歷史文化及特性、美日安保結盟、中國崛起與其在東亞地區之整合與挑戰、韓國及台灣自冷戰後之國際交往與轉變、東南亞國協(ASEAN)之擴大、亞太經濟合作組織(APEC)及跨太平洋經濟夥伴協議(TPP)發展、相關區域安全如防止大規模毀滅武器擴散、避免兩韓及兩岸地區衝突升高、區域海事衝突及能源合作等議題。

K 教授教學甚為嚴謹，上課時常冷點名(cold calls)同學回答相關問題，於探討台灣專題課堂期間，K 教授曾請本人就兩岸對“一中”論述、台灣大選以及兩岸加強經貿關係等節發表看法。此門課除繳交一份中篇(7 頁)及一份長篇(12 頁)書面報告外，並由同學分組做期末口頭專題報告。本人所屬小組報告題目為「亞太經濟整合：台灣之策略與挑戰」，分別從兩岸簽署 ECFA、台灣與美國、新加坡及紐西蘭等國家洽簽雙邊貿易協定以及台灣規劃 10 年內加入 TPP 等進行報告。此外，個人期末長篇書面報告則針對「台灣加入 TPP 之策略與挑戰」作深入研究。

3. 中國經濟暨社會發展(Economic and Social Development of China)：由 Barry Naughton 教授主講。N 教授為中國研究專家，尤其在經濟及社會發展分析有其獨特見地。此門課係以 N 教授之著作「中國經濟：演變與成長」作為主要教材，以其他重要學術期刊



與時論作為輔助。教學內容包含中國城鄉差距、市場轉型(從社會主義計畫經濟至市場經濟)、人口增長與結構變化(特別是一胎化政策)、勞動力及人力資本、農村組織與鄉鎮組織企業化、工業化、國營企業、財政暨金融改革、國際貿易暨外國投資以及永續發展等主題。

此門課評分標準 50%取自於小考、期中考及期末考成績，另 50%取自於個人專題簡報及一份 15 頁長篇書面報告。本人專題報告係以「中國南水北調工程」探討中國經濟成長與永續發展之挑戰及困境，獲 N 教授嘉評內容清晰，且地理圖片對照說明相關工程令觀眾印象深刻等語。

4. 國際環境政策與政治(International Environmental Policy and Politics)：由中國籍教授張俊傑(Junjie Zhang)授課。教學內容包括當前全球環境問題、跨國環境污染、經濟成長與環境保護、國際貿易與環境、經濟學與環境政策、政治組織與環境政策、國際環境條約及協定、全球氣候變遷、發展中國家經濟與環保等議題，讓學生自理論與實證經驗中瞭解國際環境政策與政治之演變與未來發展可能性。

張教授每週除主講一特定主題外，並由學生以開放式討論方式深入對該特定主題之探討。此外，並於 2 月 16 日安排同學模擬演練，探討 2010 年白宮與參議院為何錯失推動對抗氣候變遷之相關法案。另於 2 月 23 日以「全球減碳及氣候變遷之政策應以聯合國抑或 G20 作為協商平台」為題進行辯論。至期末口頭簡報及書面報告，本人以「台灣參與聯合國氣候變化綱要公約(UNFCCC)」為題，說明台灣參與 UNFCCC 之必要性與可能面臨之挑戰。

(三) 春季班(101年4月2日至6日15日)：在為期10週的春季班期間，本人共計修習四門課程(一門為必修，其餘3門為選修，每門課4學分，共計16學分)如下：

1. 太平洋週邊區域政策(Policy in the Pacific Rim)：為必修課程，4 學分，由 Roger Bohn 及 Stephan Haggard 兩位教授授課。此門課以實際案例作為教材，內容分作四大主題探討：(1) 公司及政府在投資過程之角色及行為分析：案例包括 1992 年美國安隆集團投資印度 M 省建設液化天然氣發電廠、1998 年迪士尼集團與香港政府洽談迪士尼樂園投資案；(2) 高度政治- 國際企業之安全考量：案例包括中國稀土出口、杜拜



港口開發案、科技產品及武器輸出管制；(3) 國營及民營企業界線設定：案例包括美國加州 2001 年電力法規鬆綁引發電力供應危機事件、2007 年美國金融風暴及政府紓困方案、阿根廷郵局民營化；(4) 國際合作及民間利益：案例包括「美國與柬埔寨紡織協定」對勞工權益保障、國際企業貪腐事件、全球氣候變遷- 碳交易的國際經濟學、巴西加入 WTO 及成為金磚四國、希臘金融危機以及中國匯率爭議等。這堂課每週上課二次，每次為時 1 個半小時，每次上課即討論前述一個案例，而且教授規定學生須完成 3 份個人或與同學合作短篇（1500 字以內）policy memo，並於個案分析前繳交作業，嗣於課堂間始進行討論。此與本人以往在國內大學及研究所就讀階段之學習方式有別，蓋國內教學方式一般傾向於老師先授課後學生方繳交報告；但美國研究所教學方式不同，許多課程均是學生在老師講解前須自行閱讀指定文章後，提出個人論點，然後與老師及同學進行討論。有意思的是，教授的觀點亦非唯我獨尊，教授的論點亦經常遭到學生挑戰，於是大家在腦力激盪之下，對某一議題提出的解決方案可以是多元及具可行性的。

此門課亦是集所有 12 門必修及選選課程之大成，所採用案例多來自哈佛大學商學院教材，議題跨國際政治、國際經濟及國際安全等範疇，使用之分析工具及討論面向亦相當廣泛。除了前揭 3 分短篇報告外，本人另與同學分組合作完成一份長篇專題書面報告，題目為：Google 在網路檢視的未來發展策略，並於學期末做口頭報告，期間並接受教授及同學提問，最後根據各方意見修正該份小組報告。

2. 中國經商(Doing Business in China)：為選修課程，4 學分，由 Barry Naughton 教授授課。此門課係以個案研究方式要求學生於每週研讀一篇在中國企業之案例並於課堂中進行研討。本學季指定研讀 8 個案例，包括：日本資生堂公司在中國大陸市場之行銷策略、中國大陸最大汽車零組件公司-BYD 公司之轉型發展、香港利豐集團 (Li & Fung Group)成功建立全球零售服務供應鏈案、高通公司 (Qualcomm) 在中國投資案、台灣企業英業達公司 (Inventec Corporation)是否持續進行代工或應轉型為品牌公司或投入軟體設計服務之經營策略、GM 通用汽車公司及上海汽車公司合作案、SAIF 創投旗下知名盛大線上遊戲公司在美國 NASDAQ 上市價格案。同學須選擇 2 個案例撰寫 policy memo，期末並繳交一篇 3 人小組專題書面及口頭報告，

本人與同學合作之專題報告題目為：如何結合中國南水北調工程在中國投資污水處理設備，教授賦予好評，認為該報告創意及商機無限，值得續作研究。

除了企業個案研究外，N 教授亦邀請幾位美國企業經理在講堂上講述有關在中國經商成功之道。本人認為，這堂課最大的收獲在於瞭解任何成功企業必須有其核心競爭力(Core Competence)、產品獨特品牌價值以及靈活的經營策略，無論是大陸本土企業或外國企業在中國投資發展均可能面臨衝擊及挑戰，唯有因應外在環境的變化，適時改變企業經營模式甚或採取轉型，始能在其他企業環伺激烈競爭下得以生存，並創造最大商業利益。

3. 政府與法制 (Government and Regulation)：為選修課程，4學分，由墨西哥籍的Alberto Diaz-Cayeros教授授課。主題包括：(1) 市場及不完全交易；(2) 交易成本及所有權；(3) 法規、立法及官僚控制；(4) 貪污；個案研究則有：(1) 墨西哥微小企業Compartamos；(2) 玻利維亞Cochabamba水資源戰爭；(3) 墨西哥道路營建暨私有化問題；(4) 巴西Belo Monte水壩興建與環保問題；(5) 阿根廷Entel電信業發展與經濟危機。

Diaz-Cayero 教授的授課方式及內容非常生動活潑，部分原因可能係其拉丁民族與生俱來的熱情與豐富的肢體語言，另渠經常以啟發方式引導學生深入思考某一特定事件或現象背後隱藏的問題，並於同學小組報告時打斷報告並提出質疑或發掘問題，甚為有趣。本堂課的評分方式包括繳交一份個人書面研究報告、小組報告（簡報）以及期末考；由於許多課程主題及內容均與政府公共政策可能對人民造成的影響相關，因此在個人的書面研究報告部分，本人選擇了近年來台灣的『文林苑都更事件』，探討政府公共政策與民眾財產權問題；另與同學合作的小組報告主題則為『玻利維亞 Cochabamba 水資源戰爭』，探討當地水源分配不均以及民營化政策非但未能改善供水情形，反而影響原住民使用水源之基本權利，導致一連串的示威抗議事件迫使玻國政府重新制定合理公共政策。

4. 東南亞經濟發展議題(Topics in Economic Development in Southeast Asia)：選修，4學分，由泰國籍的 Krislert Samphantharak 教授及美國籍 Kai Ostwald 助教分別授課。每一堂課教授均針對東南亞經濟發展過程中某一特定議題並就個別國家的發展做



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講述，議題包括東南亞國家的家庭所得不均、貧窮及脆弱性以及政府的社會政策；在經濟發展中中小企業及家庭企業之角色；發展中國家的銀行體系、銀行危機及金融體制之重整；主權債務及主權財富；經濟發展中政府與企業之關係；種族差異性及公共政策；伊斯蘭教國家之經濟與金融發展。

東南亞地區涵蓋 11 個國家，每個國家經發情形不盡相同，尤其許多國家如印尼、馬來西亞及印度等國均有多種族人口及文化差異的問題，對該國經濟發展產生若干影響。本堂課教授除要求學生能在課堂上踴躍參與討論及發表意見外，每人尚須就任何與前揭授課內容相關之主題繳交二份個人書面研究報告，並就其一做口頭簡報。本人的研究報告題目一為『台商在越南之投資』，二為『越南新娘外流』，兩者均與越南相關，原因是看到近十幾年來台商在越南的投資不僅帶動越南經濟發展，另外籍新娘特別是越南籍女子輸出亞洲國家（日本、中國大陸、韓國及台灣）均有大幅成長之趨，爰就此二項特殊發展趨勢對越南經濟及社會的影響做深入分析；教授及同學們對本人的口頭簡報『越南新娘外流』內容甚感興趣並給予好評。

## 肆、心得與建議：

### 一、課程密集，課業繁重，倍感壓力

美國加州大學聖地牙哥分校(UCSD)國際關係暨太平洋研究學院(IR/PS)是一要求甚為嚴格的學院，研究所教授於課前均要求學生大量閱讀文章，平均每星期約 400 頁原文資料，有時實難完全閱讀完畢以及吸收所有重點；此外，課堂上學生須主動參與討論，偶爾教授亦以點名方式指定同學回答，藉以測試學生是否於事前閱讀。本人自國內研究所畢業已 10 餘年，重返校園確感壓力甚大。如何在極短的時間內有效閱讀及掌握重點，以及如何強化解析式閱讀(analytical reading)、解析式思考(analytical thinking)及解析式寫作(analytical writing)能力成為亟須努力學習的方向。

由於 IR/PS 研究所標榜強項之一即為亞太區域研究，爰將“太平洋區域經濟”列為必修課程。該課程雖由前述 3 位教授輪流授課，惟內容相當廣泛，涵蓋總體經濟學及個體經濟學，且一學季僅有 10 週，課程相當密集，本人因缺乏經濟背景，對部分經濟學理論並不熟悉，課堂上頗感吃力，經常得於課前課後上網查詢



相關經濟學知識及理論，以增進瞭解。

再者，本人就讀的是一年制的碩士學位課程，主修國際關係，每學季平均須修 4 門課，三學季修滿 12 門課共 48 學分，且達校方規定成績標準以上始能畢業，此與其他東岸知名學府相較，課程似更為緊湊繁重。一整年下來，雖毋須繳交論文，惟平均提交計約 40 篇長度大小不等的專題報告，不論短篇或長篇之英文寫作，對外國學生實有一定難度，尤其語句鋪陳與文法結構，或難免有疏漏及錯誤之處。另外，本人亦深感自身英文寫作能力有待加強，爰在 UCSD 進修期間，經常赴研究所附設之寫作技巧中心(Writing Skills Center)尋求校正及潤稿協助，獲益良多。而在整體進修過程中，無論是在國際政治經濟領域以及當前國際間重要政治及安全時事議題上，均獲得更進一步之認識與瞭解。

## 二、結合我國當前重要外交政策及社經發展做為專題報告議題

本人所做的許多專題報告均與我國當前重要外交政策及社經發展相關，其中包括我與中國大陸簽署經濟合作架構協議 (ECFA)、台灣加入跨太平洋夥伴協議 (TPP) 之機會與挑戰、我國參與聯合國氣候變化綱要公約 (UNFCCC)、台灣文林苑都更事件以及越南新娘外流對亞太國家之影響等，一來可對上揭議題做深入之研析，二來可增進研究所的師生對台灣之瞭解。

## 三、增廣學識與見聞，充實人生體驗

除了研究所的必修及選修課程外，本人亦經常出席校方舉辦各種演講及研討會活動；例如謝淑麗教授在 IR/PS 研究所主持之「21 世紀中國」計畫，於第二學季期間曾舉辦多場專題演講、座談及電影欣賞等活動，本人曾利用課餘參加亞洲開發銀行呂學都顧問主講「德班會議成果與影響」，對當前國際環保政策與議題有更深一層的瞭解；另參加中國知名經濟學家吳敬璉教授主講「中國經濟發展與挑戰」以及美國任雪麗(Shelly Rigger)教授主講「為何台灣攸關重要？」一分析台灣總統大選等重要講座。此外，本人曾參加「聖地牙哥中美科學工程學會」舉辦之新春餐會，會間聆聽由榮獲 2011 年美國國家科學獎獎章之錢煦教授(中研院院士，錢前部長復之兄長)主講「科學與人生」，渠以深入淺出口吻分享親身經歷，獲益匪淺。





唸書固為進修計畫之主要目的，然而利用學校放假期間赴美國各地旅遊亦是增廣見聞之道。本人有幸親身體驗大峽谷浩瀚萬象之美、優勝美地國家公園動植物生態之豐、紐約大都會之人文薈萃與多元文化以及舊金山城市之堅韌生命力與包容性等，均不枉此行赴美進修。

#### 四、力行終生學習、期盼政府投入更多資源栽培中高階人才

就整體進修過程而言，由於 UCSD 學校高標準的要求，密集課程及繁重課業往往使學生幾無喘息的機會，著實考驗一個人之耐力、體力與心志。儘管過程中有不為人知之辛苦，然而在領取碩士學位證書的那一刻，證明自己付出的努力終將贏得甜美的果實。

本人研究所同學之中，不乏來自各國政府部門的公務人員，其中韓國及日本政府均給予渠等二年國外進修公費，其投入栽培人力之資源較我國更為充沛。本人亦期盼我政府在未來亦能投入更多之資源，提供更多機會予中高階公務人員出國進修。

學無止境，公務人員尤應以身作則，力行終生學習，以增進專業知能並建立正確的國際觀，方不致失去競爭力而遭淘汰。同時鼓勵有意申請進修之同仁，把握任何學習機會，無論是國內或國外之在職進修方式，相信均能有所成長，並期許在重返工作崗位之際，能發揮所長、貢獻所學，為公職注入新的活力與能量。

## 伍、附錄：專題研究報告 - 台灣加入 TPP 之策略與挑戰

### 摘要

對外貿易的萎縮是台灣一個嚴重的警訊，特別是其 2012 年 8 月出口下降 4.2%，已是今年以來連續第 6 個跌幅。出口減少的原因不只是受到全球經濟衰退所影響，另一則是和我與中國大陸在 2010 年簽署經濟合作框架協議（ECFA）並未帶來預期顯著效益有關；此外，台灣主要競爭對手南韓與美國、東南亞國協及歐盟簽署自由貿易協定，也影響其海外市場，因此，台灣在近期的經濟表現已遠遠落後於主要的亞洲鄰國。

台灣不應持續過度倚賴中國大陸市場，相反地應將市場分散至亞太地區的其他國家，例如與具潛力國家簽署自由貿易協定以及加入區域經濟整合均不失為扭轉劣勢局面之方式。以美國為首的跨太平洋夥伴關係（TPP）協議的擴大啟發台灣未來加入之可能性，特別是美國在台協會（AIT）主席薄瑞光日前曾表示美方願意支持台灣加入 TPP。

TPP 是一高標準協議，不僅涵蓋自由貿易協定規範，另對智慧財產權、勞工標準及環境等議題均有嚴格的要求。為實現在 2020 年前加入 TPP 的目標，台灣需要採取兩階段時間表（2012-2015，2016-2020）。在第一階段（2012-2015 年）內，台灣應密切觀察 TPP 相關發展，研究 TPP 協議涵蓋範圍，同時採取適當政策，建立多重接觸管道，期與 TPP 成員進行雙邊磋商，為台灣未來加入 TPP 鋪路。在第二階段（2016-2020 年），台灣必須調整國內經濟結構及相關產業發展以適應全球自由化，並逐步啟動與 TPP 成員展開加盟談判。

台灣申請加入 TPP 必將面臨挑戰，包括台灣本身國際地位的限制、與 TPP 成員國並無正式外交關係、國內反對聲浪、TPP 可能對台灣脆弱經濟部門之衝擊，以及中國大陸對台灣加入 TPP 之態度與反應等，均將影響台灣入盟談判之進程。然而，唯有加入 TPP 才能使台灣深化與該地區各國之經濟關係，並避免在區域整合過程中遭邊緣化，無論困難為何，台灣仍須勇往直前。



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(註：以下為本篇英文報告全文，撰寫方式係以外貿顧問小組角色向經濟部提出我國加入 TPP 之政策建言)

**To:** Ministry of Economy

**From:** Advisory Team of Foreign Trade

**Re:** Taiwan's Strategies and Challenges on Joining the TPP

***Executive Summary***

The shrinking growth of foreign trade is a serious alert for Taiwan, especially its exports in August 2012 fell by 4.2 percent, marking the sixth consecutive decline this year. Export drop is not only due to global recession, but also because the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) signed with China in 2010 did not bring significant benefits as expected, and Taiwan's major rival South Korea which signed FTAs with the U.S., ASEAN and EU affects its overseas market. Therefore, Taiwan has lagged far behind its major Asian neighbors in recent economic performance.

Taiwan should not continue to rely heavily on China's market; instead, we should diversify our markets to other countries in the Pacific region. Signing FTAs with potential countries and engaging in regional integration should be a way to reverse the disadvantaged situation. The enlargement of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) led by the U.S has inspired Taiwan in terms of its possible accession in the future. In particular, the Chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), Raymond F. Burghardt expressed recently that the U.S. is willing to support Taiwan's entry.



TPP is a high-standard agreement which covers not only main pillars of a FTA but also with rigorous requirement on intellectual property rights, labor standards and environment. To achieve the goal of entering in TPP by 2020, Taiwan needs to take a two-stage timeline (2012-2015; 2016-2020). In the first stage (2012-2015), we should watch closely the development of TPP, study the coverage of the agreement and adopt adequate policies, establish multiple contacts with TPP members and engage in bilateral consultations with potential members to help us pave the way for eventual TPP entry. In the second stage (2016-2020), we have to adjust our economy structure and related industries to accommodate liberalization, and initiate gradually accession negotiations with each member.

There is no doubt that Taiwan will face some challenges for its bid for TPP membership. Its international status constraints, lack of formal relations with TPP members, domestic opposition and impacts on sensitive sectors of the economy, as well as China's response toward its accession, all which will affect the negotiation process. However, only by joining the TPP will Taiwan be able to deepen economic relations with countries in the region and avoid being marginalized in the process of regional integration. We have to mitigate and move forward no matter how difficult or hostile the environment is.




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## Introduction

Taiwan ranks as the 18<sup>th</sup> among the world's economies and the 4<sup>th</sup> largest among the Asian countries in terms of trade volume in 2011.<sup>1</sup> Taiwan's economy deeply relies on foreign trade and its exports account for 70% of GDP. The major trading partners are China, the U.S., Japan, Singapore and South Korea. In 2011, the top five exports are China (including Hong Kong, 40.23%); the U.S. (11.79%); Japan (5.91%); Singapore (5.47%) and South Korea (4%); and the top five imports are Japan (18.54%); China, (15.49%); the U.S. (9.15%); South Korea (6.34%) and Saudi Arabia (4.92%).<sup>2</sup>

(See figure1)

**Figure 1: Taiwan's Major Trading Partners**



(Source: based on data from MOEA)

Due to the rapid integration of the global economy, numbers of FTAs which are negotiating or have concluded among Asian countries have increased from single digits

<sup>1</sup> World Trade Organization Annual Report 2012.

<[http://www.wto.org/english/res\\_e/booksp\\_e/anrep\\_e/anrep12\\_e.pdf](http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/anrep12_e.pdf)>

<sup>2</sup> Bureau of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan)

<<http://cus93.trade.gov.tw/fsci/>>



to 170 from 2000 to 2010.<sup>3</sup> However, the diplomatic isolation and the domestic protectionism of many sectors in its economy affect Taiwan signing FTAs with other countries. During the last decade, Taiwan only signed four FTAs with five Central American countries, which have a limited benefit on the trade and economic front.

After President Ma Ying-jeou took office in 2008, the cross-strait relations have improved significantly with both sides signing the ECFA which came into effect in 2011. According to scenarios of projection, Taiwan's GDP will increase about 4.4 % by 2020 with ECFA; and without ECFA, the GDP growth would be -3.5%.<sup>4</sup> It seems that in the "Early Harvest" list of tariff concessions, China's initial offer (539 items to Taiwanese products) is more than Taiwan's (267 items to Chinese goods), mainly because China believes that a deepening economic relationship with Taiwan might maximize the prospect for eventual political integration. From Taiwan's perspective, signing ECFA might become a stepping-stone in the process of attracting more signed FTAs with other countries.

However, ECFA is not a full free trade agreement and the early harvest list did not bring significant outcome as Taiwan expected. In 2011, Taiwan's exports to China only grew 8% in comparison to a 37% growth in 2010; and ASEAN's exports to China

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<sup>3</sup>. Barfield, Claude. American Enterprise Institute. "Taiwan and East Asian regionalism." November 10, 2011.  
<<http://www.aei.org/print/taiwan-and-east-asian-regionalism>>


<sup>4</sup>. Ibid.



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increased 22.68% in the same period.<sup>5</sup> Taiwan lagged far behind its major Asian neighbors in economic performance, a 3.2 percent decline in overall exports for the first half of 2012 marks Taiwan as the poorer performer among Asian countries such as South Korea (1.3%), Singapore (-0.6%), Japan (-2.3%) and China (11.3%).<sup>6</sup> (See Figure 2)

**Figure 2: Export Growth among Asian Countries (2008-2012 June)**



(Source: based on data from MOEA)

The consecutive export decline may be attributed to slackening global economy, but Taiwan's economy often hit by magnitude than other neighbors is partly because its export markets are too concentrated in China, and most of its export items are related to ICT products, as Dr. Wu, President of Chung Hua Institution for Economic Research (CIER) pointed out.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>5</sup>. Bureau of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan) <<http://cus93.trade.gov.tw/fsci/>>

<sup>6</sup>. Taiwan Economic Data Center. <<http://economy.aremos.org.tw/data/table5.pdf>>

<sup>7</sup>. "Scholars: Export Markets Need to Be Dispersed." Chung Hua Institution for Economic Research (CIER). <<http://www.cier.edu.tw/ct.asp?xItem=17265&ctNode=52&mp=1>>



Besides, implementation of the ECFA agreement over the next few years may reduce—but not eliminate—the negative impact of Taiwan’s exclusion from other regional FTA initiatives. For Taiwan, the income effects of alternate scenarios (compare to 2017 base) will be -2.03% GDP if excluded from ASEAN+3 and -2.33% GDP if excluded from ASEAN+6.<sup>8</sup>

Taiwan exports to the U.S. are also affected by the US-Korea FTA with an expected US\$3.4 billion loss; while Taiwan exports to the European Union (EU) are anticipated with a loss of US\$5.3 billion as a result of the recent inking of the EU-South Korea FTA.<sup>9</sup> Furthermore, if the proposed three-way FTA among Japan, China and South Korea is realized, and if follow-up negotiations on ECFA between Taiwan and China are not concluded by that time, the effect on Taiwan exports is forecast at a loss of US\$7.7 billion or more.

In addition to completing the ECFA follow-up negotiations with mainland China, Taiwan is negotiating economic cooperation accords (ECAs) with major trading partners. The key of joining TPP is linked to the resumption of the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) with the U.S. We expect to resume it by the end of this year because the Legislative Yuan (Congress) approved on July 2012 to lift the ban on U.S. beef imports containing the livestock leanness-enhancing drug ractopamine. Taiwan is also

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<sup>8</sup>. Claude Barfield. “Taiwan and East Asian Regionalism.” Paper Prepared for the AEI Conference. Nov. 10. 2011. <<http://www.aei.org/article/taiwan-and-east-asian-regionalism/>>

<sup>9</sup>. “TPP Expansion Up’s Pact’s Value to Taiwan”. *T@iwan Today*. June 21, 2012. <<http://www.taiwantoday.tw/ct.asp?xItem=192556&ctNode=445>>



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negotiating ECAs with New Zealand and Singapore. We have to engage in contacting on many fronts in this respect and then gradually sign FTAs with various countries in the hopes of avoiding economic marginalization.

Taiwan requires not only a peaceful coexistence with China in the cross-Strait relations on a political and economic level, but also participation in regional economic integration. To cope with globalization and regional integration, Taiwan's way out is to go from ECFA to TPP.<sup>10</sup> Therefore, the best alternative for Taiwan would be to accelerate signing FTAs with potential trading partners in the region and joining the TPP.

### ***Brief Review of TPP and Its Expansion***

The TPP was originally a multilateral trade agreement signed among Brunei, Chile, New Zealand and Singapore (P4) in 2005, in which has been in effect since May 2006. The P4 was intended from the outset to be a 'model' agreement that was open to others to join in the future. It has provided the platform for the TPP negotiations,<sup>11</sup> wherein the U.S. joined in 2009, as well as Australia, Malaysia, Peru and Vietnam in 2010.

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<sup>10</sup> "From ECFA to TPP: Taiwan's Way Out." United Daily News Editorial. June 28, 2012. <[http://vision.udn.com/storypage.jsp?f\\_ART\\_ID=94](http://vision.udn.com/storypage.jsp?f_ART_ID=94)>

<sup>11</sup> Capling, Ann and John Ravenhill. "Multilateralising Regionalism: What Role for the Trans-Pacific Partnership?" 2011, pp.1-12.



In the APEC 2011 forum, President Obama announced the framework for a vast FTA spanning the Pacific as he sought a new era of the U.S.-led economic integration in the region. He stated that nine countries had reached a "broad outlines" of the TPP and expected to be working on the legal text of a full agreement by 2012 with the aim of making the TPP a zero-tariff agreement covering 95 percent of goods by 2015. His bid for the enlargement of the TPP gained momentum as Canada, Mexico and Japan sought to join accession talks. In June 2012, Mexico and Canada were accepted by 9 members of the TPP to participate negotiations; Japan was left out because it did not reach a consensus in its own country.

TPP is a comprehensive agreement covering all the main pillars of a free trade agreement. Article 1 defines the objectives of the agreement, "the Parties seek to support the wider liberalization process in APEC consistent with its goals of free and open trade and investment. In addition, the "Broad Outlines" of the TPP covers non-conventional fields such as E-commerce, financial services, intellectual property rights, labor standards, cross-border services, sanitary and phytosanitary Standards (SPS), telecommunication, environment, etc, and may extends to other areas upon by the Parties' consensus.

It is important to point out that the application for TPP membership is based on a decision reached by consensus, even though the original P4 agreement contains an



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accession clause and encourage other economies to join the agreement. Indeed, from the outset the ultimate objective of the negotiations was to provide the building blocks for an area-wide Asia-Pacific FTA. In 2006, the idea became linked to APEC, with the Summit Leaders' endorsement of a Free Trade Agreement of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP). At present, all nine TPP members have endorsed the idea that at a minimum all APEC economy bodies are eligible for the TPP membership.<sup>12</sup> However, they also indicated explicitly that any bilateral issues between a potential new member and any of the current members should be resolved adequately before the new application. Moreover, the willingness to liberalize agricultural trade will be an important requirement for a new member as taking part in the "high-level, gold-standard" agreement that TPP aspires to create.<sup>13</sup>

### ***Why Taiwan has to Join TPP?***

The 11 negotiating partners for the trade agreement account for one third of global gross domestic product (GDP), with Japan's future accession, the global GDP share will increase to 38.19% and it will become the largest regional integration agreement. The current Taiwan exports to the TPP 11 are 25% of its total exports and to the TPP 12 (including Japan) 38%; it means that more than one thirds of our exports go to the TPP markets. Our teams estimate that if Taiwan can join the TPP in the

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<sup>12</sup> Barfield, Claude. "The United States and Asian Regionalism- The Long Road to the Trans-Pacific Partnership." Oct. 21-22, 2011, pp. 18-19.

<sup>13</sup> Shapiro. American Chamber of Commerce in Taipei. "Getting Taiwan into the TPP."  
<<http://www.amcham.com.tw/content/view/3553/519/>>



future, our GDP growth will raise 2.5% with a benefit of US\$ 11.5 billions<sup>14</sup> and this will contribute significantly to our economy.

Regarding to domestic response to the bid for the TPP membership, unlike the ECFA, this time both ruling party (KMT) and the opposition (DPP) consider that it is indispensable to join the TPP with deliberate schedule and strategies. President Ma Ying-jeou has clearly stated that Taiwan's desire to seek TPP membership and try to achieve this goal within eight years. Dr. Tsai Ing-wen (DPP's former chairperson and presidential candidate) also expressed her support for the nation's participation in the TPP. However, the pressures are mainly coming from related sectors of the economy which are concerned about possible impact or loss once open to the global market.

### ***Strategies***

In order to achieve the goal of joining TPP within eight years, Taiwan should construct a comprehensive blueprint and be well prepared towards a FTA of high standard. Our team argues that the government should adopt a two-stage policy in response. In the first stage (2012-2015), we should watch closely the development of TPP, study the coverage of the agreement and adopt adequate policies, meanwhile establish multiple contacts with TPP members and engage in bilateral consultations with potential members to help us pave the way for eventual TPP entry. In the second stage (2016-2020), we have to adjust our economy structure and related industries to

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<sup>14</sup> Bureau of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Economy of the Republic of China (Taiwan).



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accommodate liberalization, and initiate gradually accession negotiations with each member. The concrete strategies are as follows:<sup>15</sup>

### **Study the coverage of TPP and make adequate policies**

Because TPP is a high-standard agreement, it is not only involved in conventional issues such as the removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers on goods and service, but it also covers non-conventional areas such as intellectual property rights, labor standards, government procurement and environmental cooperation. So far current members are still negotiating on the “Broad Outlines” of the TPP which were announced on 11<sup>th</sup> round of negotiations in November 2011.

The Broad Outlines” are characterized with five features: (1) a comprehensive market access which eliminates tariffs and non tariffs barriers to goods and services trade and investment; (2) a fully regional agreement which facilitates the development of production and supply chains among TPP members; (3) cross-cutting trade issues such as regulatory coherence, competitiveness and business facilitation, small and medium sized Enterprises; (4) new trade challenges such as promoting investment in digital economy and green technologies, ensuring a competitive business environment across the TPP region; (5) a living Agreement which enables the updating of the agreement as appropriate to address trade issues that emerge in the future as well as

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<sup>15</sup> Bureau of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Economy of the Republic of China (Taiwan).



new issues that arise with the expansion of the agreement to include new countries.<sup>16</sup>

Therefore, the first step for Taiwan is to pay close attention to the development and the future implications of TPP in order to obtain a comprehensive understanding about the new coverage in its real content and core issues; following domestic agencies and departments can shape adequate policies based on the outcomes.

### **Establish multiple contacts and bilateral consultations with TPP members**

The accession depends on the consensus of all TPP members, so it is quite important for Taiwan to build plural contacts with the current eleven members, and seeking further bilateral consultations with each one in order to gain their support for our entry. It is intended that the TPP be a living agreement that remains relevant to emerging issues and allows for membership expansion. While expanded membership of the TPP is desirable, those seeking membership would need to demonstrate commitment to early and comprehensive liberalization so as to maintain the momentum that has been generated by existing TPP parties.

APEC is an ideal platform for Taiwan to build multilateral contacts with TPP members. We expressed our interest on joining the TPP and received initial friendly signal from the U.S. side; however, how to make other TPP members realize our commitment to a comprehensive liberalization and take position in favor of our entry

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<sup>16</sup> Office of the United States Trade Representative, Executive Office of the President.  
<<http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/fact-sheets/2011/november/outlines-trans-pacific-partnership-agreement>>



will be crucial. Through Annual Leaders' Meetings (summit) and Ministerial Meetings of APEC, make others know that Taiwan as an important economy in the region, will dedicate necessary domestic adjustments for being a potential candidate for TPP.

To date Taiwan has signed an Investment Accord with Japan in 2011, and is negotiating an Agreement between Singapore and the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu on Economic Partnership (ASTEP), an economic cooperation agreement (ECA) with New Zealand, and the TIFA with U.S. Regardless if it is ASTEP, ECA or TIFA, once the bilateral negotiations succeed, they will benefit our accession to the TPP. The recent APEC Summit held in Russia showed that, Taiwan obtained a very positive response from these countries to foster bilateral trade agreements with us. We expect that this will influence other TPP members to sign ECAs or FTAs with our country in the second stage (2016-2020).

#### **Take Adjustment to accommodate liberalization**

The TPP tariff schedule will cover all goods, representing some 11,000 tariff lines. The nine countries also are developing common TPP rules of origin, and are weighing proposals now for how to do this most effectively and simply. In addition, services and investment packages will cover all service sectors. Government procurement packages are being negotiated with each country seeking to broaden



coverage to ensure the maximum access to each others' government procurement markets, while recognizing each others' sensitivities.

Based on the high standards required by TPP, Taiwan should continue planning in its mid-term and long-term adjustment programs in order to accommodate liberalization. As we know, many TPP members like the U.S., New Zealand and Vietnam are large agricultural exporters. Once we join the regional free trade market, domestic producers of rice, fruit, livestock and dairy will experience severe competition. Although we do not have details about the negative impact on each agricultural item at this moment, our team has requested several think tanks and related agencies to do more researches and analysis in order to build a comprehensive picture.

For instance, Vietnam has large rice exports, once the TPP enters into effect, Vietnam will enjoy preferential tariff advantage and gain more market. In contrast, Taiwan's rice production scale is relatively small; whether we could resist Vietnamese competition is doubtful. In addition, according to Japan's official statistics, Japan will have a loss of up to 11.6 trillion yen, of which agricultural loss accounting for 7.9 trillion yen, 3.4 million farmers will lost their jobs, and its food sufficiency rate will drop from the current 40% to 13%. Taiwan may face similar situation once we join TPP.<sup>17</sup>

To cope with the possible impact which might endanger our agriculture, our

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<sup>17</sup> 陳于風, “加入 TPP 是台灣必走的路嗎(Should Taiwan Take the Road of Joining TPP)?” *貿易 (Trade Magazine)* March 2012. No. 249. pp 54-56. <<http://www.ieatpe.org.tw/magazine/ebook249/b5.pdf>>



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team recommend that government can include first in its annual budget a special fund for agricultural structure adjustment. For example, government enlisted NT\$ 100 billion (approximately US\$ 3.3 billion) for reducing the impact of trade liberalization when we entered the WTO in 2001. However, to compensate farmers should not be the only measure, more important, we can provide professional assistance and consultations to farmers in order to pursue a refined agriculture. Developing our products with quality and features and establish own value will be the best alternative.

In addition, to open markets significantly and sign FTAs with foreign countries, regulatory harmonization is an important key. Taiwan's particular regulations and standards enacted on local service sectors and domestic sales of electric and electronic products are obstacles to convincing foreign countries to sign FTAs with it. Because regulations and standards differ among countries of the world, which actually hamper FTA talks between different countries in some cases, Taiwan should try to work on regulatory harmonization to amend its laws and regulations to meet international standards, so as to put itself in a more advantageous position in negotiations of FTAs with other potential economies.<sup>18</sup>

Our team proposes that three Free Economic Demonstration zones (FEDZs) in southern, central and northern part of Taiwan should be established as soon as

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<sup>18</sup> "CIER: Regulatory Harmonization Is Key to Taiwan's Success of Signing FTAs." *Cens.Com-Taiwan Economic News*. August 15, 2012. <[http://news.cens.com/cens/html/en/news/news\\_inner\\_41006.html](http://news.cens.com/cens/html/en/news/news_inner_41006.html)>



possible. FEDZs are different from the traditional design of Free Trade Zones (FTZs) which focused on the development of specific industries. FEDZs contain three levels: to enhance business productivity through deregulation; to create a very liberal business environment for enterprises; and to prepare for Taiwan's moving toward regional economic integration. The government will grant free movement of capital, personnel, goods and information in these FEDZs. For example, Kaohsiung was already a free trade harbor, but making the city a free economic demonstration zone would upgrade its customs clearance efficiency and give it greater value-added opportunities. If Kaohsiung ended up being successful, then the model would be applied in Taichung (a central city) and Keelung (a northern city). The creation of such zones will help Taiwan move closer to gaining accession to the TPP.

### ***Challenges***

By pursuing the entry into TPP, Taiwan will face three main challenges:

#### **TPP members' stances about Taiwan's accession**

Although the TPP welcomes APEC members to join, it doesn't guarantee Taiwan will get admission. The U.S. government recently expressed that Taiwan could join TPP within less 10 years, but its upcoming presidential election in November 2012 will be a key factor which decides the process of ratification of TPP agreement. Yet, it is unknown what other TPP members' stances towards Taiwan's participation. Taiwan



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can not get into TPP if there is no unanimous support from all TPP members. The ban on imports of American beef containing the leanness-enhancing drug ractopamine which has stalled TIFA negotiations for more than five years has been released recently; however, whether the TIFA negotiations hold without problem could further affect other signings of FTAs and other future bilateral or multilateral trade agreements, which of course includes Taiwan's bid for the TPP membership.

### **China's attitude towards Taiwan's inclusion in the TPP**

China considers the U.S.-led TPP as a mechanism in which the U.S. attempts to counter China-led ASEAN+3 integration and agreement to EAFTA. As an emerging great power, China has reservations to join the TPP at this moment. However, will this affect Taiwan's entry to the TPP? Some may argue that the exclusion of China from the TPP will benefit Taiwan's accession. But the past experiences show that China has always impeded Taiwan not only from joining international or regional organizations, but also opposed Taiwan's signing FTAs with foreign countries in the last decade, it might express its objection on this issue, and exert pressure on its allies such as Singapore and Vietnam not to negotiate FTAs with Taiwan. So far China's public opinion against Taiwan's joining the TPP has not been expressed, and the only comment made by Wang Yi, the current director of Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council of PRC is "Is Taiwan really sure to join the TPP?"

However, we should not forget that in the recent Presidential election in January 2012, China tried to influence Taiwan's constituency by threatening the ECFA follow-up negotiations. Although we haven't heard more official comment for PRC on our bid for TPP membership, probably because China also takes a "wait and see" strategy and it is still early for them to take position on this issue. However, assuming that if China does not want Taiwan to join the TPP and sign FTAs with others, it might use the same tactics as before to impede us seeking a greater economic integration.

#### **Impacts on sensitive sectors once Taiwan joins TPP**

Taiwan has to take into account the possible impacts on sensitive sectors such as agriculture, pharmaceutical, telecommunication and financial services, etc once we join TPP. Although agricultural makes up a small part of the economy, it will become a political issue in Taiwan if the government doesn't protect agricultural interests or provide sufficient subsidies once the market has to be fully opened. We face similar difficulties like Japan when it comes to rice, fruit and meat products. Since Japan expressed its interest in the TPP negotiations, we can observe first and learn from its adopted model and the implementation of its policies. Our government should communicate with domestic sectors in advance and take appropriate countermeasures in order to reduce negative impacts.

Besides, labor and environmental issues are crucial for new participants. For



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example, TPP requires members that their domestic regulations and norms should coincide with the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the Kyoto Protocol's requirement, if not accepted these rules, it will be excluded automatically from the TPP. In fact, Taiwan is neither current member of ILO nor signed Kyoto Protocol because of diplomatic constraint, and its labor and environmental conditions have a gap with international standards. How to shorten the gap will be another target. Moreover, TPP sought to bind investment on the state-owned enterprises (SOEs), prohibit national forces on creating unfair competition environment for private enterprises. Taiwan's postal services, telecommunications, petroleum, electricity sectors which traditionally adopted a protectionist position of avoiding foreign direct investment will face severe challenges. In addition, TPP also allows that foreign enterprises have the right to resort to international arbitrations once one country's trade or investment policies damage their corporate interests. Therefore, we have to take into account of these sensible issues and make appropriate measures for minimizing negative effects.

### ***Policy Implications and Recommendations***

Basically, there are two main concerns, one is the pressure to accelerate internal reforms and the other is the main trading partners' stance.

First, the TPP is a similar mechanism to the WTO, requiring a high degree of liberalization, thus potential entrants must complete bilateral consultations with all



members. Examining the actual domestic environment, it can be concluded that Taiwan is not ready to join a high-standard FTA. Although the government has the resolve to readjust related sectors and implement regulations towards a more open market, people and related industries are concerned that joining the TPP will cause negative impacts, particularly to the agricultural sector which is already sensitive. Therefore, the Taiwanese government has to communicate well with its constituency in advance and accelerate its internal reforms in order to promote the further liberalization of the agriculture and service industries.

Second, the main trading partners (including China, the U.S. and Japan) could influence Taiwan's bid for joining the TPP. To not be marginalized in the economic integrations, Taiwan's priority is to negotiate and sign the FTAs with its major trading partners in the Asia-Pacific region. However, will Beijing oppose such actions and attempt to intimidate potential FTA partners for Taiwan into rejecting FTA dialogue? This is still uncertain. Some may argue that Washington and Taipei can add to the balance in geo-economic momentum centered on China by reinvigoration their ongoing TIFA talks and by considering other opportunities for Trans-Pacific bridge building;<sup>19</sup> the others may argue that the U.S. should negotiate and conclude a comprehensive FTA with Taiwan, and therefore aid Taiwan in pushing future membership in the TPP.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>19</sup> Rosen, Daniel H. and Zhi Wang. "Deepening China-Taiwan Relations through the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement." Peterson Institute for International Economics. June 2010, pp. 1-3.

<sup>20</sup> Barfield, Claude. "Taiwan and East Asia Regionalism" Nov. 10, 2011, p. 13.



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Not only is the American stance important, but also other TPP members' position will affect Taiwan's accession to the TPP. Some believe that Beijing's allies in the region such as ASEAN countries will consider China's possible reaction and will choose not to sign FTAs with Taiwan. Some of them are looking for a signal from China that it would not object to Taiwan's participation in this organization. From another point of view, these countries might think that if China can sign the ECFA with Taiwan, there is no reason to impede them from signing FTAs with Taiwan. So far we can not assert the external factors will benefit or undermine the possibility for Taiwan's joining the TPP, but one thing is for sure: Taiwan needs not only to build plural contacts with all the TPP members, but also has to catch up quickly in terms of negotiation skills and then the ratification and implementation at home its external commitments.

### ***Conclusion***

Taiwan has its own economic and political calculations. In terms of economic motivation, we are looking for a balance in the economic integration of the Asia Pacific, trying not to rely too much on China's market, and disperse our market towards other countries in the region; meanwhile we expect that through joining the TPP will bring trade creation and trade diversification which will reduce the risk of being marginalized in the regional economic integrations. In addition, joining the TPP can also help our



related industries to upgrade and create beneficial conditions. In terms of political motivation, it expects that through joining the TPP and signing bilateral trade and investments agreements, it can enhance its position in the international community and achieve a breakthrough the diplomatic isolation.

In short, whether Taiwan can succeed in joining the TPP within eight years, depends on the internal and external factors we mentioned above. It took Taiwan 12 years to join the WTO finally after its bid for membership since 1990. Even though there are fewer members in the TPP than in the WTO, the TPP is a complicated FTA and will definitely need more negotiations among each other to achieve the goal. It is still too early to predict the outcomes, but we believe that Taiwan will experience a long path due to its international status constraints. Nevertheless, we have to demonstrate our resolve and commitments to engage in the TPP through gradual adjustment to accommodate liberalization, strengthening economic relations with trading partners of the TPP in order to obtain their supports to our entry into the TPP.

However, China is a huge market for Taiwan and there is no doubt to deepening bilateral economic relations. However, we need enhance talks with China trying to dispel their concerns or any possible impediment toward our bid for TPP membership.

