附件 12 Anatomy of a Post Incident Fact Finding Mission



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Anatomy of a Post-Incident Analysis (PIA)



Objectives

Introduction to PIAs

Why do we conduct PIAs

Main reasons for security breaches/incidents

Case Studies

FY 2010 C-TPAT PIA Statistics

Security Breach Photos





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Anatomy of a PIA

Introduction to PIA(s)

- What type of incident does C-TPAT consider to be a security breach?
 - An introduction of restricted, prohibited, or harmful cargo or people into the supply chain, which are in violation of U.S. Customs and Border Protection laws and regulations, or the laws and regulations of other government agencies.
 - Terrorism, Narcotics, Human Smuggling, Weapons, Currency, and IPR, Health & Safety, etc...
- Notify your SCSS immediately via email and telephone
- Conduct an internal investigation gather CCTV recordings, inspection sheets, identify employees which handled the particular cargo, verify seal numbers, GPS tracking/monitoring logs, etc.
- Coordinate and cooperate with the investigation contact and forward documents and information to your assigned SCSS
- = Time frame for conducting the PIA 30 days (however, the process could be shortened to 15 days if all the above is handled expeditiously)



Anatomy of a PIA

Why are PIAs conducted?

- To assist C-TPAT with identifying where the security breach/incident occurred
 - Before/after the loading of the trailer/container
 - En-route to the trailer yard or to the U.S.
- Assist companies on how to improve security procedures
 - Trailer/container tracking, monitoring and documentation
 - 7/17 Point Tractor/Trailer/Container Inspection Training
- To provide C-TPAT companies with a corrective action plan for reinstatement after being suspended
 - Appeals process





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Anatomy of a PIA

What are some specific reasons for security breaches/incidents?

- Failure to follow through established company policy and procedures
- Improper tracking/monitoring procedures throughout the supply chain (Air, Land, Sea and Rail)
- Trailer/Container/Cargo inspections improperly conducted
- Use of non-certified subcontractors and business screening procedures
- Not conducting periodic background investigations on employees



Case Study

Narcotics hidden in sleeper compartment of tractor prior to



- Security measures in place
 - Convoys
 - Police escorts
 - GPS tracking
 - · Reporting issues with trucks
- Factors contributing to breach
 - Tracking and monitoring
 - Internal conspiracy
 - Conveyance inspections
 - Lack of management oversight

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Case Study

Multi-layered tracking and monitoring system defeated



- Security measures in place
 - Duel layered tracking and monitoring
 - Geofencing
 - Established routes and timeframes
 - · High security cable seal
- Factors contributing to breach
 - Tracking and monitoring
 - GPS settings
 - Lack of audits
 - Access controls
 - Internal conspiracy



FY 2010 PIA Statistics

- Twenty-three (23) PIA(s) involving thirty-four (34) companies were conducted by C-TPAT
- Multiple factors contributed to each of the security breaches however, the primary factors were:
- Lack of tracking/monitoring procedures: 61%
- Business screening procedures: 22%
- Improper inspection procedures: 13%
- Lack of management oversight and accountability: 4%



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Ocean Cargo Concealment







False Gas Tank



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False Trailer Floor





LD3 Container



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False Wall and Ceiling






394 Pounds of Cocaine



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


Rail Breach





Tampered bolts



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Marijuana bundles



Improper Trailer Inspection



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The Obvious!





7-point Inspection Workshop- El Paso



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附件 13 Supply Chain Security - A Global Perspective



Supply Chain Security A Global Perspective

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C-TPAT's International Strategy

 Partnering with the international trade community to help secure global supply chains.



- Partnering with individual Customs administrations.
- Support the work of international organizations such as the World Customs Organization (WCO) and the Asia Pacific Economic Council (APEC).
- Support the work of private sector organizations to improve the security and integrity requirements of their membership.



Validation Visits By Region – March 1, 2011

Canada: 5,031

Mexico: 4,076

Germany: 362

United Kingdom: 180

Japan: 387

Korea: 146

Hong Kong: 189

Philippines: 202

Dominican Republic: 60

■ Panama: 15

Colombia: 113

Peru: 48

New Zealand: 47

Jordan: 20

Turkey: 109

South Africa: 28

Egypt: 24

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Partnering with Individual Customs Administrations

- Providing Training and Technical Assistance
- Negotiating and Reaching Mutual Recognition Arrangements
- Working With Key Partners to Develop Additional Mechanisms to Accomplish the Mission




Providing Training and Technical Assistance

- China General Administration of China Customs
- Colombia Dirección De Impuestos y Aduanas Nacionales (DIAN)
- Dominican Republic Dirección General de Aduanas (DGA)
- Ghana Customs, Excise and Preventive Service
- India The Central Board of Excise and Customs (CBEC)
- Israel Israel Tax Authority, Customs Directorate
- Kenya Kenya Revenue Authority
- México Servicio de Administración Tributaria (SAT)
- Perú Superintendencia Nacional de Administración Tributaria -(SUNAT)

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International Outreach



Providing Training and Technical Assistance

Pre-Requisites for Training

- Program Has a Legal Foundation
- Program Has a Budget in Place
- Personnel Assigned to Develop / Implement the AEO Program

Duration: 3-5 Days - Both Theory and Practice

Topics:

- Eligibility Requirements
- Application, certification, and validation processes
- Minimum Security Criteria
- Benefits
- Suspension, Removals, Post Incident Analysis

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Mutual Recognition




"....it is well understood by all that mutual recognition is evolutionary rather than revolutionary in character. It will develop over time, probably first through bilateral agreements which can mature into multilateral and even groups of interconnecting multilateral pacts".

Michael Schmitz


WCO Director – Compliance and Facilitation WCO News - February 2008







MRAs Signed by CBP









Korea – Authorized Economic Operator – June 2010



Mutual Recognition – What It Is...

- Bilateral understanding between two Customs Administrations
- Security requirements or standards of the foreign industry partnership program, as well as its verification procedures, are the same or similar with those of the C-TPAT program.
- Based on security only / Compliance Issues Fall Outside the Scope of the MRA.
- Goal link the various international industry partnership programs, so that together they create a unified and sustainable security posture that can assist in securing and facilitating global cargo trade





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Mutual Recognition - Basics

Four Step Process:

- Side by side comparison of program requirements
- Joint validations
- Actual signing of the document
- Implementation



Pre-Requisites:

- Foreign Customs Administration must have an operational program in place
- Methodology in place to review and validate their members
- Program must have a security component to it



Benefits

For Customs Administrations:


- Unified Vision
- Similar / Compatible Security Standards
- Efficiency: Reduced Validations
- Risk Management Tool

For Trade Partners:


- Single Set of Security Standards
- Eliminate Redundant Validation Visits
- Faster Validation Process
- Easier to Document Business Partners Meet Program's Minimum Criteria
- Foreign AEO Partners: A lower Targeting Score in CBP's ATS







Mutual Recognition Security Model



MR – Benefit – Less Redundant Validations

C-TPAT Importer Sourcing From Japan
Due for a C-TPAT Validation or Re-Validation

If Local Company to Be Visited in Japan is AEO

C-TPAT Accepts the Status of the AEO Manufacturer

NO C-TPAT Foreign Site Visit Takes Place



MR – Benefit – Less Redundant Validations

Benefits

U.S. Importer – Does Not Have to Worry About The Foreign Validation Visit / Faster Validation Process

Foreign AEO Manufacturer - Receives a Lower Targeting Score

Foreign Customs Administration – Can Claim to Provide an Additional Benefit

U.S. Customs and Border Protection – Efficiency

Japan – CY 2010 – U.S. Dollars and Man Hours Saved

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Challenges with MR...

Operational

IT Connectivity – Non-Existent

Partner Identification Numbers – Different

Lack of Common Terms for Key Processes

Manage Expectations - Benefits

Mutual Recognition Is NOT a Green Lane



Pending MRAs – European Union



Timeline

- EU Program Becomes Operational January 2008
- Side by Side Theoretical Comparison Completed
- Workshops in the EU October-November 2009
- Joint Validations Nov. 2010 Present 13 So Far in the EU

Next Steps

- Joint Validations in the US : April to June
- Continue With the Joint Validations in the EU June to October
- Make Recommendation to Upper Management as to Next Steps




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
MR Flyers



Portal and MR



Portal and MR



Other Key Partners – Canada

5,094 Validations in Canada

2,774 C-TPAT Members in Canada

Six Business Sectors in Canada Eligible for C-TPAT Membership

- Air Carrier 2
- Importer 1,116
- Highway Carriers 1,503
- Manufacturers 147
- Rail Carrier 2
- Sea Carrier 4

Harmonization

Joint Membership One Validation


Streamline Application







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1,886

Other Key Partners – Canada

As of March 2011

- PIP has completed 600 Total Validations
- PIP has conducted 205 Validations on Companies that are C-TPAT and PIP
- PIP has accepted 869 of C-TPAT validations.
- PIP and C-TPAT have completed 43 joint Validations



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Other Key Partners - Mexico



Programa Alianza Para un Comercio Seguro – PACS

- Program Director and Full Time Staff Identified
- Pilot To Be Announced Soon / Start with Exports

C-TPAT's Support to MX Customs

- Provided Two Training Seminars in Mexico City
- Supported Two Technical Assistance Missions in Washington DC
- MX Has Participated as Observers in 12 C-TPAT Validations
- Participated with MX on Outreach Events with the Trade Community
- MX Adopted C-TPAT's Security Criteria / Validation Process





Other Key Partners – China

Third Party Validation Pilot Program

- SAFE Port Act Requirement
- Completed 2008

Three Rounds of Joint Validations with China Customs in China

40 C-TPAT Importer Members Validated

MOU on Supply Chain Security Collaboration - May 2010

Action Plan – 100 C-TPAT Validations in China in 2011 and 2012





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Partnering with International Organizations

International Organizations

- World Customs Organization (WCO)
- Asia Pacific Economic Council (APEC)

(



Associations

- World BASC Organization
- COMCE (Mexican Foreign Trade Council)
- Others





Trade Conferences and Seminars

Participate as presenters on dozens of trade events in the US and abroad





Next Steps

- Strengthen Existing, Developing Relationships
- Engage with Other Customs Administrations Towards a MRA
- Continue to Support DHS as it Develops a National Strategy on Global Supply Chain Security
- Work Closer with the WCO





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Feedback - Input

Helps Us Be A Better Program







Supply Chain Security A Global Perspective

附件 14 Practical Suggestions to Mitigate Cargo Security Risks



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Practical Suggestions to Mitigate Cargo Security Risks



Objectives

Examine seven risk indicators

- Sea Environment
- Air Environment
- Land Environment

Look at mitigating risk with C-TPAT criterion

Study examples of breached supply chains





"BSI has determined that since 2004, at least 600 attacks targeting the supply chain have occurred – a rate that equals to one attack every four days."

-BSi Grade-



Risk Indicators

- 1. Surveillance
- 2. Elicitation/Collecting Information
- 3. Probing of Security
- 4. Acquiring Supplies
- 5. Suspicious People
- 6. Dry Run/Rehearsal
- 7. Positioning for the Compromise





Surveillance

Casing (photos/notes of movements)

Following employees

Studying Routes

Corporate espionage/theft

Posing as employees/vendors

Studying Entrances



Surveillance

Sea Environment

- Doc workers monitoring vessel docking location
- Entrances and exits of seaport (port authority)
- Container staging

Air Environment

- Warehouse security camera positioning
- Accessibility to airfield or consolidation station

Land Environment

Frequency of border crossings by driver, company, or logistics provider by "Spotters"



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Elicitation/Seeking Information

Targeting employees to befriend

Social engineering

Posing as vendors

Use of fraudulent e-mails and faxes

Making unusual inquiries

Accessing unauthorized IT systems



Elicitation/Seeking Information

Sea Environment

- Gathering Basic Information Utilizing A Ship's Automatic Identification System
- Enquiring about a vessel's ship security plan, schematics, and load plan
- Acquiring information on doc worker movements and schedules

Air Environment

- Gauging ramp crew movements and schedules both on and off duty
- Asking questions about security protocols for aircraft and cargo

Land Environment

- Monitoring driver movements for trends and patterns
- Asking seemingly benign questions about a load, routing or destination



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Probing Security

Driving past the intended target

Penetrating the intended target

Purposely activating alarms

Testing established procedures for gaps



Probing Security

Sea Environment

- Doc employees on premises on days off
- Staging containers and heavy equipment

Air Environment

- Entering the airfield/warehouse with unauthorized personal belongings
- Entering a restricted zone without proper credentials

Land Environment

- Leaving predetermined routes
- Prolonging previously established transit times to the border





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Contraband Behind Aft Cargo Panel





Total of 62 Packages



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Acquiring Supplies

Lost/Stolen uniforms

Lost/Stolen employee IDs

Missing high security seals

Collecting used seals

Missing branded boxes/packaging material

CORNEL Partie Franceschipt Spitas Territor

Acquiring Supplies

Sea Environment

- Port/vessel employees reporting missing boiler suites and hard hats
- Missing trade specific tools

Air Environment

- Employees loosing multiple IDs
- Accountability for ULD's, "Cookie Sheets" and pallets

Land Environment

- Employee acquires tools necessary to modify the tractor and trailer
- Devices to block GPS signal, mechanical or technological

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Replica packaging material





Heroin imbedded in wood



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Heroin package with special markings





Suspicious People

Individuals that do not belong

Demeanor does not relate to location/area

Types of questions asked

Unusual behavior





Suspicious People

Someone unfamiliar loitering in your parking lot, office building, or warehouse

Anyone asking a lot of questions (especially concerning routes or loads or drop-off times.

Employers should be alert for unusual employment applications. Don't assume it couldn't be an inside job.



Dry Run/Rehearsal

Monitoring response times to an incident

Shipping unrelated un-manifested items

Fake shipping documents

Unanticipated problems on a routine bases





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Dry Run/Rehearsal

Sea Environment

- Attempting to pick up container without proper documentation
- Creating fake shipping documents/ghost company
- Shipping cargo to a fake address

Air Environment

- Staging bogus items in the aircraft/cargo
- Clone airway bill and similar shipment for pick-up

Land Environment

- Brake/replace seal and cross border
- commingle un manifested goods with legitimate cargo



Unknown device at importer premises



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Box comingled with manifested goods





Positioning for the Compromise

Getting into position

Crew/conspirators on high alert

Behavioral changes in demeanor and appearance

Unusual requests and breaking from routine





Positioning for the Compromise

Sea Environment

- Unauthorized schedule changes
- Uncharacteristic change in employees behavior and appearance

Air Environment

- Last minute swap/request to work specifics flights, days or times
- Employee reports to work in unusually baggy clothing

Land Environment

- A driver adamant about driving a specific load across the border
- Reporting to truck yard extremely early/late on specific days/routes



Other Risk Indicators

First time shipper

Paying in cash

Address not in line with common business districts

Weights, values, quantities don't support manifested cargo





Mitigating Risk

- Business Partner Requirement
- Container Security
- Container Inspection
- Physical Access Controls
- Personnel Security
- Procedural Security
- Security Training and Threat Awareness
- Information Technology Security





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