

IGA-225M Power in the 21st Century

Final Paper by Livia Liwei Sun

Q: If soft power rests on attraction, what produces attraction? How would your answer affect a public diplomacy strategy?

Even though it is not easy to define soft power, we may compare it with hard power in terms of how to change others' preferences, shape their agenda, or get them to do what we want them to do. In the hard power arena, we opt for tangible and coercive ways—forces and/or pay—to get the outcomes we prefer, while soft power rests mostly on indirect and intangible ways which can be called attraction.

For a country, what can generate attraction? According to Professor Joseph Nye, there are three primary resources: culture, political values, and foreign policies.

Culture is probably the one with the most penetrating effect among the three. Yet, whether the culture of a country can generate attraction or not and to what extent it produces soft power depend on the context—in particular, the context of perception, region and group. For example, the richness of American pop culture and Hollywood movies developed under its plural social system has in general attracted and been well perceived by people in many parts of Europe and Asia; as a result, helped augment the United States' influence in those areas. Yet, the same culture perceived from totally different angles may bring about displeasure, even hatred, in the Middle East, and North Korea's dictator Kim Jong-Il's fondness of Hollywood videos does not usher in the openness of DPRK or influence him to give up the nuclear program.

Regarding political values and foreign policies, these two as soft power sources quite often work hand-in-hand to generate attraction. During the Cold War, the ideology

and values—democracy, freedom, and human rights—promoted by the U.S. and forming the core of its foreign policy helped establish the international order, politically, economically and financially, in Western Europe, the West Hemisphere and East Asia. The dissemination of these values, along with the U.S. military deterrence against the Soviet Union bloc, was so successful that the fall of the Berlin Wall and collapse of the Soviet manifested the triumph of the mixture of the U.S. deterrence—hard power, and political value and foreign policies—soft power.

The 2003 war in Iraq, however, even though carrying the same hallmark of democracy and freedom, undermines U.S. soft power in a way that its credibility has been hurt. The world perception of U.S. values and intentions has been denounced not only by the Middle East but also by many traditional allies under the context that the U.S. was a unilateral self-interested invader.

Apart from the above three sources, military (hard) and economic (sticky) power is also ways to produce soft power. Regarding military power as a soft power source, a good example is that after the 2004 tsunami hitting countries in the Indian Ocean, a US aircraft carrier was sent to waters off the Indonesian island of Sumatra in support of the rescue and relief efforts. Its military power combined with humanitarian aid greatly boosted U.S. influence and image in the region.

As for economic power, it can be hard and soft, which is why Walter Russell Mead called it “sticky power.” Countries with strong economies and prosperity are usually attractive, such as the four Tigers in East Asia. China’s economic power has also provided it a considerable amount of attraction over the past decade, even though the

perceptions about its soft power projection may differ from country to country, and region to region.

While talking about how the above sources of soft power affect public diplomacy strategy, we should first understand that it is especially challenging to shape such a strategy in that nowadays not only governments but non-state actors, such as NGOs, media individuals and terrorists like Bin Laden, also possess different tools to disseminate their soft power to some degree. *depends on audience + context*

In view of the soft power resources that generate attraction, public diplomacy strategy will be affected in a cross-cultural way by not only people-to-people exchanges but also by radio and TV broadcasts, media and the websites. As a result, public diplomacy should operate on two levels: "communication and engagements"¹ and the following may help shape public diplomacy strategy:

- Adopt an audience-oriented and cross-culture approach: This is probably one of the most critical factors to affect contemporary public diplomacy strategy. To differentiate audiences with varied backgrounds, cultures and beliefs is key to have effective public diplomacy communication, and the objective is messages with a consistent theme in different forms, so that they can be conveyed more effectively. *good*
 - Sketch a comprehensive and strategic scheme: As written above, in addition to the three primary resources, hard power (military) and sticky power (economy) are important sources as well. Therefore, organizations that mainly possess individual sources—for example, the Department of Defense with hard power, USTR,
- yes*

¹ Quote from a speech by Judith McHale, Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs of the Department of State.

Department of Commerce and other relevant agencies with economic tools, and the State Department managing soft power instruments—should work together and coordinate with each other to sketch an inter-source and comprehensive scheme.

- Emphasize long-run communication efforts along with short-term concentration: People's perceptions will not be changed over night, yet, through long-term policy and communication, it is possible to change ideas over time.

This is a very good essay that uses the course concepts in an intelligent way. Could say more about engagement and how the quest relates to non-state actors.

Q: The American National Intelligence Council predicts that U.S. power will decline in the next decade. What will the global balance of power look like in the next two decades and what will be its defining characteristics?

According to Gregory Treverton and Seth G. Jones, a state's power can be conceived at three levels: 1) Level one: resources or capabilities (power-in-being); 2) level two: power conversion through national processes; and 3) level three: power in outcomes. In light of the National Intelligence Council's (NIC) assessment, while the first two kinds may remain stable, the U.S. ability to assure outcomes is likely to decline.

Power in outcomes then may be talked over in both absolute and relative terms. According to the NIC project, the U.S. absolute power will remain the strongest but its relative strength will decline and "U.S. leverage will become more constrained." Therefore, we may make the first bold preliminary conclusion that the U.S. is still the one with the largest aggregate power, just like today, but it will not be as preponderant as it is now. Consequently, the U.S. will have to share its leading role with other rising powers

and the world will be more reliant on collective decision-making. In the next decade, there will be no hegemon in the world.

Which countries are rising? It is evident that the BRICs—Brazil, Russia, India, and China—are poised to assert more power and influence on the global stage; yet, the level of influence and the power status may differ among the four. In particular, China and India, respectively with one-fifth and one-sixth of global population, both nuclear powers and at the same time possessing varied ancient civilization and modern culture to project their soft power, and both with considerable talents in science and technology field, are going to stand out among BRICs and vie for regional leadership in Asia. Judging from now, China is likely to gain upper hand; in particular, it is not far from unseating Japan as the second largest economy in the world. China will also keep its pace to generate military might, which has maintained a double digit increase annually for over twenty consecutive years, to prepare not only for military contingencies in the Taiwan Strait, but also for other regional contingencies, particularly conflict over resources or territory². In the next decade, China will expand its power—military, economic and soft—to the extent that the decline of U.S. power may be so conspicuous and the gap between the two will narrow down so greatly that more countries will seem to opt to ally with China.

*I Russia
misled, as
declining*

*How will rivalry among China, India, Japan
affect Chinese power? US power?*

Existing powers, such as the European Union, Russia and Japan, will remain influential; however, the center of international politics will shift from the trans-Atlantic to trans-Pacific. Under such climate, another significant country in Asia that has embarked on the road to emerge will be Indonesia. With its largest Muslim population in

good

² United States Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress, Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2007

the world, transforming into a democracy, being resourceful of oil, and establishing itself as the most important player in ASEAN, its potential role to counterweigh other powers or become a balancer will guarantee Indonesia a seat on the international stage. | 6000

The process of power diffusion that has taken place since late last century will keep evolving, thanks to globalization and the progressive and rapid development of technology in the Internet age. Transnational actors, non-state actors and even individuals, like terrorists, are able to continue to harness power to influence state governments' decision-making process on global and regional affairs, or even launch attacks.

Even though international institutions have been in place and in nature served the global interest since the end of WWII, the functioning of these institutions has much hinged on the leadership of the U.S. In the next decade, with the decline of the U.S. power and the transition of power to other rising powers, the world seems likely to be more unstable and uncertain and may even have to go through a period of power struggle. The outcome will be decisive in shaping the next two decades. In the absence of a uni-polar (i.e. hegemonic) environment, one of the three outcomes will pertain:

1. Non-polarity: Richard Haas defines it as "a world dominated not by one or two or even several states but rather by dozens of actors possessing and exercising various kinds of power." In other words, in non-polarity, not only U.S., BRICs, EU, Japan, and other regional powers, but also international organizations, NGOs, and non-state actors all will be able to share global power. Under such international order, if economic integration and cultural penetration can be guaranteed by the U.S., regional powers and international institutions, it will be likely to help ease the tension between actors.

2. Multi-polarity: Rising powers are able to relatively catch up with the power of the U.S., but none of them, including the U.S., possesses the preponderance of power necessary to make unilateral decisions on any internationally important issues. With states being key players, the temptation to use military power will be increasing. Such a system might create an unstable international order, since "multi-polar systems tend toward inequality" as argued by Realist John J. Mearsheimer.
3. Bi-polarity: Neo-realists believe that a bi-polar system is the most stable. As we have seen during the Cold War, both nuclear powers, the U.S. and Soviet Union, were so powerful that war became unlikely, because they were also muscle-bound and that any miscalculation could lead to mutual assured destruction. Will another bi-polar system emerge in the next two decades? It is not unlikely and depends on the power transition process, but will have quite different characteristics from the last bi-polarity. If a bi-polar system looms on the radar, the U.S. still will be one of the two to balance the world power, and the other end does not have to hold confrontational ideology. With China having the most feasibility to share the similar power status in the political spectrum, the U.S. should in every way try to shape its counterpart to become a "responsible stakeholder" in international community so that the world may have a chance toward mutual assured construction and peace.

— Which of these three scenarios do you find most compelling?

Good essay, but needs more of a conclusion and explanation of why one or more of the three is more or less likely than another. Also say more about interactions of diff types of power.

Grade A

To: Prof. Meghan O'Sullivan
Fr: Livia Liwei Sun
IGA-226
The Geopolitics of Energy

The Prospect of Carbon Capture and Sequestration

Coal is playing and will continue to play an important role as a major supply source of energy consumption in the United States. In the electricity sector, coal-fired power plants accounted for 51% of electricity generated domestically in 2008. In terms of supply, coal took up 22.5% of total energy supply in 2008¹. Projecting to 2030, coal consumption will increase by 0.7% per year on average, on condition that new technology to constraint carbon dioxide (CO₂) is applied². One may conclude that the consumption of coal will increase roughly 16.5% by 2030.

Due to coal's continuing importance of being a major source of energy consumption, how to manage the critical issue regarding carbon dioxide emissions during its production process, which are also deemed by many scientists around the world as the leading contributor to global warming, has been discussed over the past years. Even though most of such kinds of technology as dealing with controlling CO₂ emission are comparatively newly developed, carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) is the kind that has been brought on the table.

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Advantages of adopting CCS technology:

- Coal is relatively abundant and cheap: This is not only true for the United States; Russia and China also own immense coal reserves. In the U.S., as of January 1, 2008, the demonstrated reserve base (DRB) of coal was estimated to contain 489 billion short tons³. In addition, coal currently can provide usable energy at a low cost. Even though existing capturing technologies are not cost-effective⁴, with time when CCS is developed into a more mature and integrated-scale stage, the cost should be able to be offset through technological advancements. Consequently the technology should also be economically viable by the continuing production of coal for another few decades.
- Addressing energy security concern: Reliance on imported fuel such as petroleum and natural gas from politically unstable areas has put the U.S. energy security at potential risk. Therefore, diverting energy sources and reducing dependence on imported oil is in alignment with America's strategic and energy interest. Coal with CCS technology then becomes a reasonable and strategic option not only to secure energy stability in the U.S. but also to reduce world oil price by a way of coal being a reliable substitute for oil.
- Helping create clean energy commercial opportunities: Adopting a suitable model of

Can we
assume
this will
happen
anymore?
over?

¹ Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Review 2008

² Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2009

³ Energy Information Administration (<http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/coal/reserves/reserves.html>)

⁴ U.S. Department of Energy (<http://www.fossil.energy.gov/programs/sequestration/capture/index.html>)

public-private partnership (PPP) to develop CCS technology should bring about potential commercial interests and business opportunities; which in turn will be an incentive for private sectors to build up partnership with government and to invest in coal-fired power generating plants with CCS. Moreover, the reduction of CO₂ emission will enable the U.S. to gain competitiveness in the world "cap-and-trade" market.

the U.S. is not perfect technology

- *Efforts made by the U.S. government:* In response to the request by the U.S. Congress in 2008, U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) Innovations for Existing Plants (IEP) Program has shifted focus to R&D on carbon dioxide capture technologies⁵. In addition, when Secretary of Energy Steve Chu gave a speech at Harvard Kennedy School in early August this year, he clearly stated that the U.S. has to "figure out how to use it (coal) in a clean way and an economically viable way." These actions, though symbolic, do release encouraging signals about the U.S. government's goal to develop CCS.

Challenges ^{of} adopting CCS technology:

we have issues Regulatory framework & costs to industry why to scale

- *Regulatory and legal framework is not in place yet:* Building a new coal-fired power plant with CCS technology is a huge-scale and extremely expensive project. According to the U.S. Carbon Sequestration Council's report, "a commercial scale power plant equipped with current CCS technology can easily cost over \$2 billion."⁶ Without a comprehensive regulatory framework to manage aspects related to such projects, which involve storage site selection, incentives and subsidies, transport, ownership, monitoring, and long-term liability, the stakeholders—including owners of existing power plants, potential investors for future projects, researchers and policy designers in the government—will probably slow their efforts or even choose to sit on the fence for now.
- *Commercial readiness?* Even though CCS technology has been adopted by some European countries, it seems it has not yet reached technical readiness to create a commercial market. This probably relates to the high cost of the projects as well as the lack of policy instruments as mentioned above.

high point ✓

Recommendations:

- *Establishing a policy regime is crucial:* Issues related to the development of CCS, such as the cost, timing, R&D progress and public-private partnership, to some extent, all depend on the shaping of the policy regime. In addition, the policy framework should also encourage

⁵ U.S. Department of Energy (<http://www.fossil.energy.gov/programs/powersystems/pollutioncontrols/>)

⁶ The U.S. Carbon Sequestration Council, *Wanted: A Legal & Regulatory Framework for Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS)*, April 2009

existing coal-fired power plants to be equipped with CCS technology. Overall, a legal framework to regulate the development of CCS is fundamental to the future of this technology.

Also
to
answer
input
questions
about
storage -
for now
long,
who
manages,
who
monitors?

- *Initiating experimental projects with potential partners:* While the shaping of a policy framework may take time, the step that can be taken now is to initiate dialogues, research programs, and even experimental projects in cooperation with potential investors. The purposes of such projects are to gain more understanding about sequestration sites, identify the capacity of potential investors, and acquire practical experiences. In addition, when the legal process is finished, it can waste no time to proceed to the next stage.
- *Continuing exploring international cooperation:* Countries with substantial coal reserves should all be interested in developing and advancing CCS technologies. Yet, apart from technological cooperation, governments and non-state actors can also explore the possibilities of gaining political power and commercial interest through world market mechanism; furthermore and given time, this might be able to reduce the oil exporters' sometimes irrational influence on the market.

/perhaps best places to
store CO2 are in these
countries in underground
caverns - an unexpected
twist of fate!

A-

Good structure to the
paper and identification
of the big issues
associated w/ CCS.

Big issue here is
the need for government
assistance / subsidization
to incentivize ~~growth~~ ^{development} of commercially
viable CCS projects -
otherwise concerns are
cost + rising of other sources
will discourage potential
investors + entrepreneurs

TO: President Barack Obama

FROM: Jeffrey Bader, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Asian Affairs, National Security Council

SUBJECT: Assessing the U.S.-China Relations prior to the State Visit to China

DATE: November 1, 2009

The relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC) has been characterized as the most important bilateral relationship in the 21st century. It not only influences the development of current issues of global importance, such as ^{the} world economy, climate change and nonproliferation, but also will shape the map of international politics and the shift of the balance of power in the next two decades. China has risen as a regional power and asserted more influence on the international stage. The course of China's rise will present ~~itself~~ an opportunity as well as a potential challenge to the U.S. Mr. President, in anticipation of your first trip to Asia, including China, ~~It~~ is crucial to assure your counterpart that the U.S. is pleased to see a peaceful and prosperous China and to work with China to tackle global issues. Meanwhile, we should also urge the Chinese to play a positive and constructive role, specifically, in helping ^{to} ~~resolving~~ the issues of Iran, Sudan and Burma to demonstrate it is willing to share more global responsibilities that match the level of its rising power.

The Evolving Relations over the Past Decades and the Shift of the Balance of Power

- Since China's opening up itself to the world in 1978, its rapid economic growth has become the most remarkable and successful case in human history. The nature of its relations with the United States has also evolved dramatically. From the U.S. perspective, the role of China had changed from a balancer against the Soviet Union during the second half of the Cold War to a strategic competitor in the first year of former President George W. Bush.
- The 911 terrorist attacks once again altered the nature of the bilateral relations. Due to the common goal of counterterrorism, China was not a strategic competitor anymore and the ties between the two sides were able to further deepen. The term "a responsible stakeholder," first introduced by former Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick in 2005, showed the American expectation towards China's role and became the major theme in dealing with China during Bush's second term.
- Over the past few years, while ~~the~~ American foreign policy mainly focused on the Middle East and anti-terrorism, China was able to take advantage of the power vacuum left by the U.S. in many regions to increase its global influence. With the rise of China, along with another regional rising power India, the traditional economic power Japan, and the overall

vibrant political and economic dynamics in Asia, the gravity of international politics will shift from the trans-Atlantic to trans-Pacific and trans-Indian in the next decades.

The opportunities and potential challenges:

• Opportunities:

1. With the rise of China and the shift of power from the West to the East, ~~the~~ *✓* international politics has been quite different from the confrontational bipolarity during the Cold War. Even though there are gaps in terms of political values between China and the U.S., China does not represent or advocate a confrontational ideology like the Soviets towards the U.S. On the contrary, China has been able to rise within and benefit from the global economic and trade system built by the U.S. and the West. For both the U.S. and China, it seems reasonable that our national interests will be better served by working together to shape the future international system. */ good point*
2. Regarding the wide range of global challenges facing both countries, such as world economy, climate change, clean energy, and regional security, even though the Chinese *are* ~~is~~ not on the same footing with us yet, the bilateral dialogues have been vigorous in which both parties recognize we have shared interests and are willing to manage disputes. *✓*

• Potential challenges:

1. How long can China's peaceful rise *be ed* sustain? Even though China has generally played a constructive role in pushing North Korea, which is a more immediate security concern to the Chinese, back to the six-party talks, it has not been able *←* to assert its influence on other troublesome countries--such as Iran, Sudan and Burma. In particular, the U.S. and international community have expected China to pressure Tehran by fully imposing sanctions on the regime to halt proliferation. We haven't yet seen China play such an active role on this issue. This will make the world doubt if we can bet our future on China's peaceful rise. *or no been willin* *✓*
2. The ambition of China's military might: China will continue its pace to generate military might, which has maintained a double digit increase annually for over the past two decades. Its rapid military modernization and increases in capabilities raise questions about the purpose of this buildup and China's lack of transparency. Moreover, Japan and India have regarded China's military power as a strategic threat, which may trigger regional arms races in the future. How to consolidate our alliances with Japan, South Korea and Australia and further engage with India and at the same time not to posture *present* ourselves as adopting a containment policy towards China will be a critical challenge for the U.S. and its allies and partners in the region.

3. Others: Even if its international status and power is rising, the potential domestic problems facing China are challenging. Mismanagement in such problems might ignite different scales of instability in the country, which might even shake the region. In addition, there are long-standing disagreements in Sino-U.S. relations on issues such as human rights, Taiwan and Tibet. While these issues are not centerpieces in our current interactions with China, they can be prickly from time to time.

Reiteration of our Positions and Policy to the Chinese Leaders

I suggest the following points be reiterated during your meetings with the Chinese leaders:

- The United States welcomes a confident, peaceful and prosperous China, one that appreciates that its growth and development depends on constructive connections with the rest of the world.
- The United States will work with China to deal with issues of global importance, including climate change, regional security and the revival of ^{the} global economy. Particularly, we look forward to China's role of being a significant stakeholder in the upcoming climate change conference in Copenhagen, Denmark. ✓
- On issues of nonproliferation and Iran, we urge that China's action will demonstrate to the international community that it is willing to take more positive and constructive responsibilities matching its rising influence and power. We also urge China to assume an active and firm role in dealing with Sudan and Burma.
- The Chinese will always ask us to respect the issue of China's sovereignty. In ^{is} the regard, the U.S. will remain committed to its one-China policy based on the three Joint Communiqués and the Taiwan Relations Act.

you should provide more detail here what specific we are asking China on Iran, Darfur and Burma

Livia - Thank you for this memo. This is a clear, effective and sensible set of recommendations for Obama to consider. Please see my comments. More detail on some of the major ideas would be helpful. You should also proofread.

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